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CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND
THE FAILURE OF MODERN PROPERTY
THEORY
JILL M . FRALEY*

Property rights are, I argue, the single largest legal limitation on our ability
to respond effectively to the climate change crisis. This is because our
understanding of the scope ofproperty rights shapes and limits legal concepts
such as regulatory takings, land use law, common law tort and property claims,
and statutory environmental regulation. Property sets our cultural norms
about how much the government can or should control the uses of land. The
goals of this Article are to (1) historically demonstrate the failures of sociallyoriented property theory as they are represented in the analytical framework of
doctrines such as social utility and (2) advance a sustainable theory ofproperty
whose usefulness is demonstrated by that historical examination.
From a common law model ofproperty based on near complete control by
private landowners, property theory evolved to a model of viewing property as
a vehicle for managing the competing interests of the individual owner and the
larger society. From this model ofcompeting interests, modern property theory
weighed in on the side of society, reframing property interests largely in terms
ofthe community and social relationships. I argue that the social relations and
community approaches as they have developed in the case law have
environmentally failed us.
Community-based concepts have permeated the common law of torts and
property, nudged into statutes, and undermined and eroded the protections that
had been available. This erosion emergedfrom ostensibly social concepts, such
as social utility, that were so neutral and malleable that they became entangled
with a norm ofindustrial productivity. Having developed that association, they
proliferated through property and tort law, insulating defendants.
To address climate change, we need strong federal environmental
regulation, coupled with local access to effective common law claims as a
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backup and safety net. Both of these must have a foundation on property's key
true social utility, which is human survival.
We cannot rely on the paltry and inaccurate framework ofprivate owner
against society as our social model of property, but instead we must give
community-based concepts like social utility a true normative meaning,
centered on sustainability and with land as the unique, finite, and foundational
resource.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Property rights are, I argue, the single largest limitation on our ability to
respond effectively to the climate change crisis. This is because our
understanding of the scope of property rights shapes and limits not only relevant
legal concepts such as regulatory takings, land use law, common law tort and
property claims, and statutory environmental regulation but also cultural norms
about how much the government can or should control the uses of land. As a
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result, our theories of property-particularly how we define the scope of private
rights to land-must change if we want a legal system that is positioned to
respond to the climate crisis. The goals of this Article are to ( 1) demonstrate
the failures of modem property theory as it has been incorporated into property
doctrine (as concepts such as cost benefit analysis or social utility) and (2)
advance a sustainability-focused theory of property whose usefulness is
demonstrated by that historical examination.
Property theory underpins and explains property law, which is, I argue, the
foundational limit of environmental law. The extraordinary power and
significance of property law within American law more generally creates this
relationship due to the connections assumed and endorsed between property
and liberty or individual freedom. 1 Environmental law is effectively impossible
in a system where the theory of property espouses a model of near complete
control by private landowners. Thus, when environmental regulation
developed in the twentieth century, property scholars re-worked traditional
ideas of the meaning of property.2
Re-working property theory allowed scholars to argue for increasing levels
of regulation based on a different understanding of the nature of those private
ownership rights or entitlements. This reoriented property right is not about the
relationship between a person and land but instead about the relationship
between an individual and the rest of the society. 3 An entitlements model of
this sort then tolerated a degree of regulation of private land, pushing back
against the prior norm of absolute individual control of private property.4 In
1. Eduardo Penalver writes, "Property rights enjoy almost mythical status within American
political thought in large part because of this commonly accepted connection to individual freedom."
Eduardo M . Penalver, Property as Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1890 (2005). Property in America
not only has this mythical status but also one that has a commensurate perception of morality. See
Thomas W . Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality ofProperty, 48 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1849, 1849
(2007) (arguing that no system of property can stand without a moral principle and that the American
system does in fact operate with the assurance of such a principle).
2. The view of private and social obligations as the defining map of environmental law and
property is often shorthanded as the tragedy of the commons. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244--45 (1968) (introducing this metaphor for the two competing interests
and arguing that without regulation, the individual owner will exhaust resources to the detriment of
society).
3. From the perspective of the individual owner, arguably the value of property lies in the way
that "property supposedly facilitates the individual' s exit from the demands of community." Penalver,
supra note 1, at 1892.
4. As Smith explained, "No longer can the owner of Blackacre claim with much force that
ownership entails the right to use the resource without interference." Henry E. Smith, The Language
of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN . L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2003). Smith concludes,
"Thus, the idea that a property right is a right to a thing that avails against the world has been replaced
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this approach, everything is imagined in the context of the competing interests
of the individual owner and society. This framework also explains why both
courts and property theorists continue to struggle with the degree to which the
principle of exclusion is the central feature of property law. 5
Within the context of environmental law, the social relations theme of
property theory could then address externalities, such as pollution, by endorsing
more substantial environmental regulations. Society is seen then as the victim
of the individual landowner; society is also the vindicator of sustainability
through regulation. The idea then is to think of property as social rights, not
absolute individual rights, thus promoting the regulation of private land. The
value of community trumps the individual right, thus weighing in on the side of
more regulation in the conflict between private owner and society. 6 We still
often hear this push, as though it has not yet been sufficiently successful. For
example, in 2009 Joseph William Singer began an article by arguing, "Property
is a social and political institution and not merely an individual entitlement."7
His statement reflects the continuing need theorists feel to push back against
the rights/entitlement/individual side of the spectrum.
Within this model of competing interests, modem and progressive property
theory weighed in on the side of society, reframing property interests largely in
terms of the community as a quintessential legal value and a defining
characteristic of what it means to have property law. While modem property
theory has been highly fractured, a central feature, which is retained by the more
recent progressive theory, is a social-relations approach that favors community
over the individual. 8 This Article focuses on this feature not only because it is
with the idea that a property right is only one possible entitlement plucked from a wide range of equally
privileged results." Id.
5. Among current theorists, Smith offers the strongest statement in favor of property as organized
primarily around the value created by exclusion. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of
Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2012).
6. It is, of course, a fallacy to think that the individual owner and society are always opposed.
For example, the value of stable ownership may weigh in favor of both the current owner and society
more generally in the long term. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory ofProperty,
90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 538 (2005) (arguing that property law foundationally creates and defends
value via stable ownership).
7. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1010 (2009).
8. Progressive property also specifically focuses on social relationships and seeks innovation in
terms of reworking concepts to respond to the ''underlying human values that property serves," in other
words the community values. Gregory S. Alexander, Eduardo M . Penalver, Joseph William Singer &
Laura S. Underkuffler, A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743, 743 (2009).
Similarly, another thread of theory focuses on the idea of human flourishing and, similarly, aligns with
the notion of community as a push back against the individual's desires. See, e.g., GREGORY S.
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a strong thread in what is otherwise a loosely woven cloth but also because
there is more evidence of the social-relations approach being utilized within the
courts (via such mechanisms as social utility) and in environmental statutes (via
the cost benefit analysis).
This Article demonstrates how courts have adopted social utility as a
marker of community. Social utility, which has its origins primarily in nuisance
law, has proliferated to a variety of other property, tort, and environmental
contexts. The problem is that the social value content in this concept is so broad
and vague that it has been shaped into an economic and industrial focus, which
ignores all other models of social value, including sustainability.
The evolution and proliferation of the concept of social utility demonstrates
how the social relations or community approach to property theory, with society
aligned against the individual, is environmentally failing, at least as the courts
are employing it. The idea of social utility has, in fact, undermined and eroded
the protections that had been available under property and tort law.9 I argue
that the community and social relations value is too general and without scale,
both of which allow it to be manipulated by individual parties in litigation,
generally in favor of the polluter. Community can be interpreted so narrowly
as to potentially create reliance interests of the neighborhood in an existing
industry, as seems to be recognized in cases such as the United Steel Workers
case from Youngstown, Ohio, 10 or so broadly as to support a colossally
destructive copper smelting plant due to the job and tax base it created for a
large number of people. 11 Community as a value is both too broad and too
narrow and may support what are, in fact, incommensurable goals. As a result,
the court cases give us a history of the manipulation of community values
within tort law. This history, however, also points us to a better framework by
providing insights into the kind of property theory that would be necessary to
support a legal system responsive to a climate crisis.

ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M . PENALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 81 (2012);
Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
745, 760--72 (2009).
9. See Jill M. Fraley, The Uncompensated Takings ofNuisance Law, 62 VILL. L. REV. 651 (2017)
(explaining how the concept of social utility has diminished the protections of nuisance law to the
degree that it creates judicial takings).
10. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611,
621 (1988) (discussing this case and others in the context of the property rights that might exist in the
workers and community due to the existence of a business or industry); see also United Steel Workers
v. United States Steel Corp., 631 F.2d 1264, 1265 (6th Cir. 1980).
11. See Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 661 , 666-67 (Tenn.
1904).
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In the threads of modem and progressive property theory, there are
occasional moments when land shines through as a part of the analysis, 12 but
these are, I argue, too rare. A coherent language of property theory will be a
language of land, a language of sustainability. To better support the efforts of
progressive and other modem theorists, we must reorganize the debate
altogether around the key values that will provide us with a workable future:
conservation, sustainability, and even (I am sorry to say) rationing.
Even without the climate crisis, the polarized owner-society approach is a
losing game. It is too paltry of a framework to manage our resource dilemmas
successfully in the long-term precisely because the analytical structures of
property law have emerged around the assumed to be competing interests of the
owner and society without regard to the unique nature of land as a limited and
damaged resource, required for both the owner and society, as well as future
generations. The underlying normative commitments of the existing scheme
quite literally lack common ground.
This Article advances a theory of real property centered on the unique
nature of land as our universal and most foundational sustaining and limited
resource. This approach should prove useful because to address climate
change, we need strong federal environmental regulation coupled with local
access to effective common law claims as a backup and safety net-both of
which must have a foundation on a redesigned understanding of private
property in society. This theory reorganizes the polarized debate around the
individual owner and society, which has (perhaps unintentionally but also
crucially) omitted land entirely from the equation, reformatting the
relationships around the land itself. This theory responds to not only the climate
crisis but also the more general failures of the community and social relations
approach, which are insufficient for this task for multiple reasons.
Next, and relatedly, community as a social value is too malleable to support
a strong statement about property and climate change. Meanwhile, nothing less
than a strong statement for sustainable land uses will support the level of change
necessary to address the climate crisis. Social relations and community are
about people. A sustainable property theory puts land before people because
only by doing so can we ensure a future for the people. We must understand
property as our sustaining landscape that must be protected.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides the background of
property theory necessary to explain our current predicament, including the
valuable changes made with modem property law and the challenges modem
12. As much as I appreciate these efforts, I believe they often function more as poetry within
philosophy, an aside rather than the central text. For example, Penalver speaks ofland, human activity,
and memory. See Eduardo M. Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 829-30 (2009).
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property law leaves for a sustainable future. Part II first explains the historical
lens and then examines the relationship between property theories and
environmental law within the first two eras: the common law era and the
modem era of viewing the individual and society as competitors before the
courts. Because it is the primary case study for the argument, I reserve
evaluation of the current era for Part III, which provides a case study of how
the community approach, as framed and integrated by the courts in the concept
of social utility, has proliferated through the causes of action in tort law,
undermining common law claims that could support environmental values. Part
III argues that the concept of social utility has been framed in the community
values espoused by modem property theory, and yet social utility has repeatedly
served to undermine environmental goods by focusing instead on business
development, jobs, and tax dollars to the detriment of the environment.
Drawing on the history and examination of current property theory, as well as
case law, Part IV proposes a new approach to property theory that is grounded
in sustainability and reintegrating land into our definitions of property.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PROPERTY THEORY
A. Early Property Theory: The Individual, Possession, and Exclusion

Early property theory focused on the individual private owner's
relationship to land. Unsurprisingly, much of early property theory primarily
addressed the acquisition of property. 13 Focusing on acquisition meant that,
particularly within the British tradition, possession formed the heart of
ownership because it was the point at which property was bom. 14

13. See CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY & PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND
RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 12 (1994). Initial acquisition of property is a central preoccupation of
theorists because any theory of property must ground itself in some account of how initial rights were
acquired from the great primordial commons. See John T. Sanders, Justice and the Initial Acquisition
ofProperty, IOHARV. J.L. &PUB. POL'Y 367, 368-69 (1987).
14. The British approach drew from the Roman tradition in particular. Under Roman law, land
had to be continuously possessed lest another begin occupancy: quad nullius est, fit occupantis. 1
JOHN ERSKINE, AN INSTITUTE OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 257 (1871). The Roman approach
emphasized labor, focusing on a system of property ownership that maximized utility. See Brian
Gardiner, Squatters' Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for Equitable Application of Property
Laws, 8 IND. INT'L & COMPAR. L. REV. 119, 124-25 (1997). Possession effectively claimed not only
"things which had not as yet fallen under the power of any proprietor, but [also] those which had been
lost or relinquished by the former owner." ERSKINE, supra, at 257. Notably, however, Roman law
limited each person to the land he could cultivate himself, thus distributing land broadly throughout
the community. Gardiner, supra, at 124.
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Possession, however, did not refer to occupation as much as to enterprise
and cultivation.15 In other words, perfecting a claim of ownership required a
change in land use to one that was less sustainable-i.e., from forest to pasture
or from bog to field. 16 Philosopher John Locke's approach to labor supported
these ideas with a theory of property acquisition that favored land use
changes. 17 Locke summarized the rule of possession as follows: "Whatsoever
he tilled and reaped, laid up and made use of, before it spoiled, that was his
peculiar [r]ight." 18 Carol M. Rose once explained that "first possession is the
root of title" was the "maxim of the common law." 19
This British colonial approach to property theory settled into the common
law via William Blackstone. Blackstone argued, "[O]ccupancy is the thing by

15. See PATRICIA SEED, CEREMONIES OF POSSESSION IN ElJROPE'S CONQUEST OF THE NEW
WORLD, 1492-1640, 26--27 (1995). Without religious and racial components, the basic legitimacy of
claiming empty territory continues in international law. Unoccupied land without an indigenous people
appears to be available to first possessors, perhaps even when those claimants are not sponsored by
any nation-state (at least so far as property, not sovereignty or jurisdiction, would be concerned). See
L. Benjamin Ederington, Property as a Natural Institution: The Separation of Property from
Sovereignty in International Law, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 263, 265-66 (1997) ("Despite the absence
of a state sovereign to give legal sanction to these rights, customary practice nonetheless has repeatedly
recognized private property rights in terra nullius." ).
16. For example, Pennsylvania's charter granted the right to claim land "not yet cultivated and
planted." Charter for the Province of Pennsylvania-1681, YALE L. SCH. : THE AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l 7th_century/pa0l .asp [https://perma.cc/36NR-62F3].
The early scholarly tradition agreed. Grotius explained, "[U]ncultivated land ought not to be
considered as occupied." HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 202 (1925). Vinogradoff
argued that occupation "for purposes of cultivation gives rise to a possessory right." PAUL
VINOGRADOFF, THE GROWTH OF THE MANOR 80 (1905).
Modern scholars have seen similar patterns. Laura Brace argued that the idea of cultivation and
land "improvement" has centrally "affected attitudes towards property and ownership." Laura Brace,
Husbanding the Earth and Hedging out the Poor, in LAND AND FREEDOM: LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE BRITISH DIASPORA 5 (A.R. Buck, John McLaren & Nancy E. Wright eds., 2001 ). Carol Rose
described possession's texts as "those of cultivation, manufacture, and development." ROSE, supra
note 13, at 20.
17. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287-88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988).
18. id. at 295 . Of course, Locke limited his theory of property ownership significantly, by
limiting acquisition of private rights to only "where there is enough, and as good left in common for
others." Id. at 288. Locke explained, "[I]feitherthe [g]rass of his [e]nclosure rotted on the [g]round,
or the [f]ruit of his planting perished without gathering, and laying up, this part of the Earth,
notwithstanding his [e]nclosure .. . might be the [p]ossession of any other." Id. at 295. In terms of
the origins of rightful possession, Locke explained "at the beginning, Cain might take as much [g]round
as he could till, and make it his own [!]and," but he was obligated to "yet leave enough to Abel ' s
[s]heep." Id. (emphasis omitted).
19. Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 75 (1985).
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which the title was in fact originally gained." 20 Notably, as this approach rooted
in British law, occupancy came not just to require residency or changes in land
use but specifically to require as much change as possible, meaning a property
claim was not established unless there was "full and complete utilization" of
the property. 21
Early American cases emphasize the role of land use in establishing
possession or occupancy. 22 Landowners sought to demonstrate their possession
by taking land to a more developed state, such as was available within the
context of the landscape. 23 Courts sought land use, such as could be "required
by the character and situation of the lands"24 or "the circumstances."25 Courts
particularly sought information about the development of land "for such
purposes as it is capable" to establish proof of possession. 26 A successful land
use for the purposes of establishing possession was "an
occupancy ... according to its adaptation to use."27
The language of these cases emphasizes possession and property in terms
of the maximization of development, often with a patriarchal attitude. When it
came to land, the role of the owner was "subjecting it to the will and dominion
of the occupant."28 Cases favored changes to the landscape itself when
possible: "[C]ultivation, enclosure, or erection of improvements."29
Early property theory linked possession with a key right of ownership: the
right to exclude others.30 The right to exclude others connects directly to the

20. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1766), reprinted in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 45, 51 (Robert C. Ellickson, Carol M . Rose & Bruce A. Ackerman
eds., 3d ed. 2002).
21. Pat Moloney, Colonisation, Civilisation and Cultivation: Early Victorians' Theories of
Property Rights and Sovereignty, in LAND AND FREEDOM: LAW, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE BRITISH
DIASPORA, supra note 16, at 31 .
22. Courtney v. Turner, 12 Nev. 345, 352 (Nev. 1877) (requiring a "beneficial" use of the land
to establish possession).
23. See id.
24. Allaire v. Ketcham, 55 N .J. Eq. 168, 170 (N.J. Ch. 1896).
25. Courtney, 12 Nev. at 352.
26. State v. Newbury, 29 S.E. 367,368 (N.C. 1898).
27. Morrison v. Kelly, 22 Ill. 609, 624 (Ill. 1859).
28. Courtney, 12 Nev. at 352.
29. Quatannens v. Tyrrell, 601 S.E.2d 616, 619-20 (Va. 2004) (quoting LaDue v. Currell, 110
S.E.2d 217,222 (Va. 1959)).
30. Notably, exclusivity has been so soundly regarded as the central feature of property that
social scientists tend to define property as a theory that "determines exclusive rights." Timothy Earle,
Archaeology, Property, and Prehistory, 29 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 39, 39-40 (2000).
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role of property in sustaining lives. 31 The right to exclude was firmly
entrenched in British law before the American Revolution; it has been described
as "the bedrock of English land law."32 Blackstone referred to property as "that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe." 33
Similarly, American property law has strongly emphasized the right to
exclude. 34 James Madison defined property as "dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every
other individual."35 Revolutionary era thinkers thought carefully about
property and the right to exclude because, for them, property was inherently
intertwined with the idea ofliberty. 36
31. One way of thinking of the right to exclude is to think in terms of scarce resources. "In an
anticommons, by my definition, multiple owners may each exclude others from a scarce resource and
no one has an effective right to use." Michael Heller, Empty Moscow Stores: A Cautionary Tale for
Property Innovators, in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PuBLIC AND PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP 189, 190 (Charles Geisler & Gail Daneker eds., 2000).
32. Hunter v. Canary Wharf Ltd. [1997] 2 WLR 684 at 706 (Lord Hoffman). With that said,
Carol Rose has argued that Blackstone would have seen the right of exclusive possession as an "ideal
type rather than [a] reality." Carol M. Rose, Canons ofProperty Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108
YALE L. J. 601,604 (1998).
33. Rose, supra note 32, at 601.
34. Earle, supra note 30, at 40.
35 . James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 598 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
36. Jennifer Nedelsky has written about this intersection:
To begin with, the problem of property arose for the Framers because their
conception of it was inseparably tied to inequality. The link to inequality was
liberty. Property was important for the exercise of liberty, and liberty required
the free exercise of property rights; this free exercise would inevitably lead in
turn to an unequal distribution of property. Property thus posed a problem for
popular government because this inequality required protection; those with
property had to be protected from those who had less or none. Without security,
property lost its value.
Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162, 164 (1990).
In this model the right to exclude also takes center stage. Nedelsky explains: "Property provided an
ideal symbol for this vision of autonomy, for it could both literally and figuratively provide the
necessary walls. The perverse quality of this conception is clearest when taken to its extreme: the most
perfectly autonomous man is the most perfectly isolated." Id at 167.
Notably, modem property theorists may also share this attitude toward property and liberty.
Joseph Singer wrote, "Property law and property rights have an inescapable distributive component.
As Jeremy Waldron explains, '[P]eople need private property for the development and exercise of their
liberty; that is why it is wrong to take all of a person's private property away from him, and that is why
it is wrong that some individuals should have had no private property at all."' Joseph William Singer,
Property and Social Relations: From Title to Entitlement, in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES
TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE OWNERSHIP,supra note 31, at 3, 11.
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Property scholars through the first half of the nineteenth century shared
Madison's view. For example, Morris Cohen wrote in 1927 that "the essence
of private property is always the right to exclude others."37 And later theorists
have understood traditional property theory consistent with this focus. As
Joseph Singer explained, "The classical view of property concentrates on
protecting those who have property."38
The U.S. Supreme Court has continuously supported this emphasis on the
right to exclude. In 1979, the Court described the right to exclude as a
"fundamental element of the property right." 39 In the same case, the Supreme
Court explained that the right to exclude is "one of the most essential sticks in
the bundle ofrights that are commonly characterized as property."40 In 1982,
in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Court noted, "The
power to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured
strands in an owner's bundle of property rights.''4 1 More recently, in Lingle v.
Chevron USA Inc., the court spoke of the right to exclude as "perhaps the most
fundamental of all property interests.''42
Scholars similarly emphasize the importance of the right to exclude in the
traditional American concept of property. J.E. Penner and Thomas Merrill both
argued that the right to exclude is the centerpiece of the concept of property.43
Carol Rose agreed, arguing that the right to exclude is often considered a
defming characteristic for the institution of property. 44

B. Modern Property Theory: Social Relationships and Community
Modem property theory conceptualized property rights as rights against
others in society. Such a model reduces the emphasis on the owner's private
rights and invites more intense regulation of private land. Simultaneously, such
a model pushes back against the idea of absolute individual control. Modem
property theory is, in the words of Pefialver & Katyal, a "body of literature

37. Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927-28).
38. Singer, supra note 36, at 12.
39. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80 (1979).
40. Id. at 176.
41. 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982).
42. 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
43 . J. E. P ENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 103 (1997); Thomas W. Merrill, Property
and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998).
44. Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce and Inherently Public
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711, 711 (1986).
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emphasizing the dialogic and social nature of property law and eschewing
the ... static, individualist conception of property rights.',4 5
This body of literature generally begins with Wesley Hohfeld, who reconceptualized property rights in the twentieth century by arguing that the
central function of property was not to order the relationship between an
individual and an area of land, but rather to order social relationships.46 His
approach was not entirely new, 47 although the social relations approach is seen
as defining modem property theory.
Hohfeld's approach became a norm for understanding property in the late
twentieth century. Singer,48 Munzer, 49 and Rose 50 all reformulated property as
a set of social relations.
Singer argued "that the traditional classical conception of property centered
around absolute control of an owner should be replaced by some version of this
social relations model.'' 51 Singer emphasized the conservative and unyielding
framework of traditional property theory, finding that "[t]he image underlying
ownership is absolute power of the owner within rigidly defined spatial
boundaries."52 He explained, "The classical conception is furthermore
premised on widely shared norms of promoting autonomy, security, and
privacy. Yet the classical model of property is distorted and misleading both
because it is descriptively inaccurate and because it is normatively flawed." 53
Singer sought a new model because he had significant criticisms of the
traditional model for property theory. Singer stated, "The classical model
misdescribes the normal functioning of private property systems by vastly
oversimplifying both the kinds of property rights that exist and the rules
governing the exercise of those rights. It also distorts moral judgment by hiding

45 . Eduardo Moises Pefialver & Sonia K. Katya!, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095,
1101 (2007).
46. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 720---23 (1916---17). Although Hohfeld's thesis has been highly
influential, there are dissenters. See, e.g ., PENNER, supra note 43, at 2 (arguing that property is best
understood as "the right to a thing") .
47. Jeremy Bentham wrote, "There is no image, no painting, no visible trait, which can express
the relation that constitutes property. It is not material, it is metaphysical; it is a mere conception of
the mind." Nicholas Blomley, Landscapes ofProperty, 32 LAW & Soc'y REV. 567, 572 (1998).
48. Singer, supra note 36, at 8.
49. Stephen R . Munzer, Property as Social Relations, in N EW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 36 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).
50. ROSE, supra note 13, at 4.
51. Singer, supra note 36, at 4.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 5.

2020]

PROPERTY THEORY & SUSTAINABILITY

105

from consciousness relevant moral choices about alternative possible property
regimes." 54 Singer ultimately proposed a new approach:
[A] conception of property based on social relations. This
model reconceptualizes property as a social system composed
of entitlements that shape the contours of social relationships.
It involves, not relations between people and things, but among
people, both at the level of society as a whole (the macro level)
and in the context of particularrelationships (the micro level).55
Laura S. Underkuffler highlighted the social aspect of property by defining
property as "the resolution of conflicting claims and conflicting desires for what
are often external, physical, finite goods." 56
Similarly, Harold Demsetz described property rights as "instrument[s] of
society [that] derive their significance from the fact that they help a man form
those expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others.
These expectations find expression in laws, customs, and mores of a society." 57
Demsetz focuses on what property gives a private party within a social
context. According to Demsetz, "An owner of property rights possesses the
consent of fellowmen to allow him to act in particular ways. An owner expects
the community to prevent others from interfering with his actions, provided that
these actions are not prohibited in the specifications of his rights."58
In many ways, there is nothing new about the social relations approach to
property. Blackstone's famous formulation of our affection for property
contains words that belie the social nature of property-concepts such as hold,
dominate, and control. 59 Such concepts only make sense in relation to other
individuals. There is no need to dominate, hold, or control if you have no
competitors. Therefore, although Blackstone spoke to private property, he
outlined the rights in a way that set them in opposition to others in the
community. So perhaps it is no surprise that most recent scholars of property
theory situate themselves within the social relations approach to property. 60
54. Id.
55. Id. at 8.
56. LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY: ITS MEANING AND POWER 143 (2003).
57. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory ofProperty Rights (1967), reprinted in THE ECONOMICS
OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 31 (Eirik G. Furubotn & Svetozar Pejovich eds., 1974).
58. Id.
59. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at 45-52.
60. See Penalver & Katya!, supra note 45, at 1101 (citing themselves as members of the ongoing
discussion). Penalver and Kaytal cite to the following scholars and works as contributing to the
developing literature on social relations and property:
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS
OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 1 (1997); ERIC T.
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Adjusting to viewing property through a social lens did not require modem
property scholars to veer away from the primacy of the right to exclude, as it
was formulated in the earliest years of the new American Republic. Indeed, in
this regard, modem scholars have been quite consistent with traditional
property theory, continuing to affirm the right to exclude. 61 As Goldstein and
Thompson argued in 2006, "[T]he cornerstone of private property is the right
to exclude anyone and anything from your property that you don't want on your
property."62 Maintaining a focus on the right to exclude may be, indeed, quite
logical given the history of territorial claims as an instigator of violence. "It
may be the case that most trespasses are relatively minor offenses . . . . But, all
the same, ... most wars are fought over territory. Property does matter, as
centuries of battles, large and small, to defend it show."63
Modem property theory has, however, often treated the right to exclude as
insufficient to justify or explain the concept of private property. Adam
Mossoff, for example, includes the right to exclude within his understanding of
property but finds that it is "essential but insufficient" for explaining property. 64
Therefore, while modem property theorists generally are willing to affirm the
importance of the right to exclude, it is but one component of their theories.
One significant strain of modem property theory emphasizes the
intersection between law and economics and property.65 Modem property
FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON
GOOD 7 (2003); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF
PROPERTY 11 (2000); Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy:
Residential Associations and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7
(1989); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy, I YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7,
7 (1989); Laura S. Underkufller-Freund, Response, Property: A Special Right, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1033, 1034 (1996); Andre J. Van der Walt, Property Rights
and Hierarchies of Power: A Critical Evaluation of Land Reform Policy in South
Africa§ 1.4 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
Id at 1101 n.19.
61. See, e.g., Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104
MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1836 (2006) (describing the right to exclude as "foremost among the property
rights").
62. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE, AND
CONSERVATION 53 (2006).
63 . Nicole Stelle Garnett, Property In-Laws, 156 U. PA. L. REV . PENNUMBRA 279, 287 (2007);
see also Preface of PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 20, at xvii ("Wars and revolutions
are commonly fought over property rules and property distributions.").
64. Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371,
377 (2003).
65 . While modem property's social relations approach may seem "soft," the economic
component adds a layer of irrefutability. Economics, like other sciences, benefits from the air of
scientific certainty. "Scientific knowledge is politically powerful in part because it seems to exclude
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theory is consistent with an economic perspective that thinks of pollution as an
externality.66 While a landowner may profit from a specific land use, that use
may also generate negative consequences (externalities) for other surrounding
landowners.67
Law and economics then addresses itself to the problem of competing
interests of private landowners, in particular the two competing rights to
exclude. One landowner may wish to exclude society from influencing his land
uses, while the other wishes to exclude the externalities. Such disputes must be
dealt with through property or tort law. Law and economics provides rationales
for how such disputes should be resolved. Although the model can be adapted
to respond to more national and international interests such as climate change,
scholars have primarily conceived of the model and developed the theory in the
context of a few neighbors who are all private property owners. 68
Law and economics approaches are also consistent with modern property
theory in maintaining an emphasis on possession. Modern legal theory has not
refuted the emphasis on possession and instead acknowledges possession as a
key component of American property theory. 69 Similarly, law and economics
approaches have favored the rule of first possession, arguing for the rule's
efficacy in rewarding labor and promoting active use of resources. 70
There is a certain symmetry behind law and economics approaches and
modern property theory's embrace of the social relationships approach. For
example, Abraham Bell and Gideon Parchomovsky have proposed a theory of
property based on the idea of organizing property rules to favor "the value
inherent in stable ownership."71 While Bell and Parchomovsky's theory makes
sense based on utilitarian economics, a property system that promotes stable
ownership is also likely to promote non-violence-at least in its initial setting
of distribution with land in abundance. Such an understanding is also an

the arbitrary and subjective. Scientists seem to provide universally valid, impersonal, nonideological
conclusions, transforming questions of power and politics into the subjects of rational, value-neutral
inquiry." Joy Rohde, Gray Matters: Social Scientists, Military Patronage, and Democracy in the Cold
War, 96 J. AM. HIST. 99, 100 (2009).
66. Doug Rendleman, Rehabilitating the Nuisance Injunction to Protect the Environment, 75
WASH. &LEEL.REV. 1859, 1877-78(2018).
67. Id. at 1877.
68. See J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law, 21 PACE ENV'T L.
REV. 179, 193 (2003).
69. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221,
1221-22 (1979); Rose, supra note 19, at 73 .
70. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 3.1, at 36 (5th ed. 1988), reprinted in
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW, supra note 20, at 54, 59.
71. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 6, at 538-39.
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intuitive one and can be understood in the short-term as an on-the-ground view
that might have influenced the adoption of private property regimes.
One of the first modem property theories to focus on the community and
social relations came from Carol Rose, who also incorporated a law and
economics perspective in her model. In a 1988 essay, Rose focused on the
"hard-edged" doctrines that we tend to prefer in property law.72 She
acknowledged that economics suggest the more important something is, the
more inclined we are toward hard and fast rules, but she also argued that "[w]e
establish a system of clear entitlements so that we can barter and trade for what
we want instead of fighting." 73 Rose did not explore this idea in depth,
however, as her primary focus was on the two types of property rules-(1) clear
or strict and (2) muddy or blurred-and their increasing tendency to move
toward each other. 74
Ten years later, Rose revisited the issue in the context of discussing
Blackstone and the origins of claims to private property.75 She noted,
"Permanent claims allowed the 'occupiers' to avoid conflicts with one another
and encouraged them to labor on the things to which they now claimed a durable
right. ... Exclusive dominion is useful because it reduces conflicts and induces
productive incentives."76 Yet, she moved over the connection to violence
quickly to focus on the link between established, secure claims and the overall
generation of wealth or willingness of occupiers to invest in property. 77 Indeed,
she later questioned whether first-possession rules promote or prevent violence,
suggesting that "[t]he problem is that a first-occupancy principle invites
everyone to grab at everything, and everyone winds up fighting with everyone
else." 78 As she later argued, "Blackstone's massive doctrinal sections disclosed
very little to remind readers of the reasons of the self-seeking, possibly violent
and certainly problematic initial grabs of initial occupancy." 79
In her influential 1994 book, Rose re-examined Locke's approach to first
possession rules and concluded that what society chose to reward was not so
much the labor of cultivation but more the labor of "speaking clearly and

72. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577,577 (1988).
73. Id. at 578 .
74. Id. at 580 ("This paper is about the blurring of clear and distinct property rules with the
muddy doctrines of 'maybe or maybe not,' and about the reverse tendency to try to clear up the blur
with new crystalline rules.").
75 . Rose, supra note 32, at 601.
76. Id. at 60fr07.
77. Id. at 607.
78. Id. at 609.
79. Id. at 61 I.

2020]

PROPERTY THEORY & SUSTAINABILITY

109

distinctly about one's claims to property."80 Rose emphasized communication
because of its economic utility; clear communication about ownership
minimizes waste and maximizes efficiency in the system. 81 Rose's emphasis
was on the economics. 82 As she said, "Economists have the answer: clear titles
facilitate trade and minimize resource-wasting conflict."83 Rose implicitly
favored Bentham's view of property as primarily directed toward wealth and
prosperity.84
In looking to the question of what determines possession, Rose explained
rules of possession in terms of social relationships. She argued, "The clear-act
principle suggests that the common law defines acts of possession as some kind
of statement." 85 More forcefully, she describes, "Possession as the basis of
property ownership, then, seems to amount to something like yelling loudly
enough to all who may be interested."86
Indeed, by investigating the idea of first possession we can discover some
truths about the nature of our concept of property, 87 but we need not necessarily
do so by focusing on the value of communication in terms of the economics,
primarily referencing wealth and investment as Rose did. A more critical
component, and one Rose briefly mentions, is communication's role in
preventing violent conflicts. 88 This understanding also dovetails with other
approaches that focus on the types of labor that create visible changes on the
land.
Rose adopted the communication approach because "it correctly draws
attention to the intensely social nature of property."89 Rose critiqued the
traditional view of land as seen through the lens of individual rights. Rose
explained, "In a more sophisticated version of property, of course, we see
property as a way of defming our relationships with other people." 90 Rose
reasoned, "[A] property regime winds up by satisfying even more desires,
because it mediates conflicts between individuals and encourages everyone to

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
Feminist

ROSE, supra note 13, at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 16.
See id. at 16-20.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 4.
Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory,
Theory, reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAw, supra note 20, at 28, 30.
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work and trade instead of fighting." 91 Rose then emphasized that "Locke's
major addendum to this picture was to show the relevance of property to the
desire to live. He pointed out that life depends on property, in a very primitive
sense; if one cannot literally appropriate those berries and fruits, one will
simply die." 92 For Rose, the link between property and sustenance illustrates
the social aspects of property law, particularly the construction of ownership
around scarce resources. 93 Overall, Rose's approach joined economics with
social relations to create a more communal understanding of property rules.
C. Progressive Property Theory, Modern Property Theory, and Community
as Social Value

Progressive property follows modem property law in retaining a central
focus on the social nature of property. 94 Joseph Singer began a recent article
with a simple statement of this approach: "Property is a social and political
institution and not merely an individual entitlement."95 If we are to distinguish
between modem property theory's endorsement of community as a central
value, the contribution of progressive property theory may be to push that
community value to the more liberal political persuasion. Ezra Rosser
describes progressive property theory as taking "on the mantle of a socially
minded understanding of property."96 Progressive property continues the
modem focus on social relationships but adds a layer of emphasis on specific
''underlying human values that property serves."97 With that said, arguably,
progressive scholars do not, as Ezra Rosser has argued, "have a monopoly on
thinking that property should serve human values. " 98
Ill. PROPERTY THEORY AS ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Environmental regulation in the United States can be divided roughly into
two eras: (1) an initial period with limited regulation except through common
law tort and property actions and (2) a later period with centralized
environmental statutes taking over the key role of regulation. This Part begins
by explaining why a historical perspective is the appropriate lens needed to

91. Id. at 31.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 30.
94. Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive Property, 101
CALIF. L. REV . 107, 116 (2013).
95 . Singer, supra note 7, at 1010.
96. Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 401-02 (2015).
97. Alexander, Penalver, Singer & Underkuffier, supra note 8, at 743 .
98. Rosser, supra note 96, at 401.
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examine this issue. This Part then discusses those two eras of American
environmental law and how particular concepts of property theory have
supported those approaches to environmental regulation.
To understand how property theory impacts environmental law, this Article
adopts a historical perspective. Such a perspective is critical for an accurate
analysis of the law as well as for building theory in the context of the climate
crisis. 99
Recently, historians have become particularly aware of their lack of a role
in the work of policy change surrounding the climate crisis. Yet, a role for
historians in this discussion is critical: "Historical analysis allows us to move
beyond scientific and technical findings to contextualize them." 100 Paul Sabin
recently examined this problem. He argued "that historical thinking and
analogies already powerfully influence energy and climate policy-but with
little participation from historians. Historians have allowed myths that valorize

99. Our understanding of history and our focus on landscape impacts how we approach
environmental regulation generally. For example, consider how the German historical view of property
contrasts with the American perspective:
Unlike the American wilderness ethic, an ideal that has valued spaces devoid of
human influence, the Germans' concept of Landschaft envisioned the ideal
environment in a pastoral sense, as a cultivated garden that blends the natural,
cultivated, and built environments in an aesthetically harmonious whole.
Reinforcing this sense of Landschaft as both a cultural and a natural space is the
political meaning of the world, which refers to a unit of territorial administration,
such as a province or region. The two meanings of the word were often
intertwined, so that the visual state of the Landschaft was thought to mirror the
spiritual condition of the community. The German trajectory of environmental
preservation also placed the cultural landscapes of home, not the sublime places
of the distant wilderness, at the center of environmental perception and care.
THOMAS M. LEKAN, IMAGINING THE NATION IN NATURE: LANDSCAPE PRESERVATION AND GERMAN
IDENTITY, 1885-1945, at 15 (2004) (footnote omitted).
In American history, misconceptions of places have prevented action to preserve nature. As
David Robertson wrote, "Myth often obscures the complex realities of place, and this observation holds
equally true for locales occupying unfavored perceptual territory. For example, symbols of difficult
and unwholesome living, impoverished central cities, and isolated rural boondocks are also burdened
by misperception." DAVID ROBERTSON, HARD AS THE ROCK ITSELF: PLACE AND IDENTITY IN THE
AMERICAN MINING TOWN I (2006). Robertson explains, "Mining has created a symbolic landscape
similarly stigmatized. In the popular imagination, mining landscapes-mineral extraction and
processing areas and the adjacent settlements for mine workers-have become icons of dereliction and
decay. For those who live in these places, however, these landscapes may function as meaningful
communities and homes." Id. at 2. As a result, "[t]here exists a long tradition of scholarly and literary
description equating mining landscapes with dereliction and decay." Id. at 4.
I 00. Paul Sabin, The Ultimate Environmental Dilemma: Making a Place for Historians in the
Climate Change and Energy Debates, in 15 ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY 76, 77 (2010).
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a free market in energy to dominate the public discourse, presenting current
production and consumption patterns as largely unchangeable." 101
The role of historians is particularly important in understating the history
of energy usage in the United States as well as the history of regulations that
have either discouraged or encouraged this use. Sabin argued:
Historians can help ensure that climate and energy debates
better reflect a fundamental historical truth-the energy
system reflects political power and social values as much as
the latest engineering and science. A greater appreciation for
that history can enable greater understanding of the potential
routes to addressing the climate problem. 102
A historical perspective can also illuminate the role of tort decisions in
establishing and encouraging energy markets. For example:
Judicial rulings during the oil era often deferred to oil's
privileged position and importance.
As the California
Supreme Court ruled in a 1928 court case opening the coastline
to oil drilling, "the development of the mineral resources, of
which oil and gas are among the most important, is the settled
policy of state and nation, and the courts should not hamper
this manifest policy except upon the existence of most practical
and substantial grounds." 103
There is a similar narrative for coal, showing how the market for coal
declined as a fuel-when it was being burned in homes for energy-but then
increased again as an energy source for electricity. These narratives
emphasized the importance of industrial land uses and stigmatized less invasive
land uses.104 Notably, there was no lack of awareness of the devastating
environmental impacts of mining throughout these decades. David Robertson
has written about this part of mining history. Robertson explains, "Mining has
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 85 (citing Boone v. Kingsbury, 206 Cal. 148, 181-82 (Cal. 1928)).
104. Assuming that development is the best use, and that natural land is not being put to any use,
a resident manager of a coal company explained: "We just donated 150 acres for a new regional airport,
and we're open to other ideas. We don't intend to walk off and leave this land to the Indians." John
Egerton, Boom or Bust in the Hollows ofAppalachia, N .Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1981, at 57. This represents
the majority view at the time, a false dichotomy suggesting that those who are not dominant over nature
are subjected to it or submissive. See RODGER CUNNINGHAM, APPLES ON THE FLOOD: MINORITY
DISCOURSE AND APPALACHIA 96 ( 1991 ). It also illustrates the continuing problem of the mentality of
land that is not developed is not being used-precisely the argument that was used to remove lands
from Native Americans on the theory that land wasn't "discovered" until a white man found and used
it. It is again, a cultural view that was enshrined by judicial opinion-Johnson v. M 'lntosh, which
essentially argued it was a waste to leave land as wilderness. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590
(1823).
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also created some of the country's most environmentally troubled landscapes.
Few industries have such a profound and visible impact on the environment." 105
Our awareness of these problems began centuries ago: "As early as the
sixteenth century, mining was recognized as a destructive force in Europe; and
environmental problems created by mining began to concern the U.S. public in
the 1880s." 106 Additionally, environmental law largely emerged in response to
the problems created specifically by the mining industry; such regulation was
desperately needed. 107 "Indeed, mining was among the nation's first industries
to be regulated on the basis of environmental concerns, and as the industry's
footprint spread into the nation's diminishing wild lands so did awareness that
mining severely impaired the quality of land, water, and air." 108 Despite the
development of regulation, however, the level of consumption for key mining
goods such as coal continued to increase. 109
This story, however, is not just a story of public consumption. "As these
coal stories show, executive, legislative, and judicial branches set public energy
policies together." 110 These mining increases were, in part, also fueled by
specific legal policies, not just in terms of federal and state statutes but also by
specific judicial decisions. For example, one property decision by the Kentucky
Supreme Court-a jurisdiction located in the heart of coal countryrevolutionized the ability of coal companies to access mineral reserves and push
aside the rights of land-owners and neighbors.11 1 The 1987 ruling by the
Kentucky Supreme Court "reinstated the provisions of the antiquated broadform deed, a document that awards virtually all mineral rights claims to coal
companies and not to landowners." 112

105. ROBERTSON, supra note 99, at 3.
106. Id.
107. By 1920, Professor Ronald Eller, a historian, described the transformation of the
Appalachian landscape: "The once majestic earth was scarred and ugly, and the streams ran brown
with garbage and acid runoff from the mines. A black dust covered everything. Huge mounds of coal
and ' gob' piles of discarded mine waste lay about." Patrick C. McGinley, From Pick and Shovel to
Mountaintop Removal: Environmental Injustice in the Appalachian Coalfields, 34 ENV'T L. 21, 26
(2004). And this theft of resources continues to threaten Appalachians. Mountaintop mining has
"stripped their hillsides of vegetation, obliterated streams and drainage patterns and turned the hollow
into an overflowing funnel every time rain drains off the mining plateau being created above their
houses." Francis X. Clines, Flooding in Appalachia Stirs Outrage Over a Mining Method, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 12, 2002, at AS.
108. ROBERTSON, supra note 99, at 3.
109. See id. at 2-3.
110. Sabin, supra note 100, at 86.
111 . Akers v. Baldwin, 736 S.W.2d 294, 304-05 (Ky. 1987).
112. DONALD EDWARD DAVIS, HOMEPLACE GEOGRAPHY: ESSAYS FOR APPALACHIA 21
(2006).
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History is critical to developing theory because "[p]ivotal decisions shaping
the energy system are found not just under the rubric of 'energy' policy, but
also as tax policy, regulation, property rights, and public infrastructure. Energy
intersects with virtually every aspect of our economy and social organization,
so energy policy often is made in unexpected places." 113 Additionally, a
historical perspective lends depth to an analysis of how new sources of energy
fare on the market: "Wind energy and other renewable forms of energy continue
to suffer comparisons based on their relative market price. The political history
of energy in the United States shows clearly, however, that relative market
prices reflect past politics as much as current economic factors." 114
A similar argument can be made for the role of not only culture and markets
but also statutes and judicial decisions in creating an automobile and roads
focused culture that drove up the consumption of both oil and gasoline within
the United States. The automobile and roadways of America became "a visual
symbol of the American dream of individual freedom through mobility." 115
Thus, "an auto- and truck-oriented roadside landscape began to emerge by the
mid-1920s." 116 This focus on the gas-guzzling automobile did not emerge
simply from a good Ford marketing campaign. Instead, "[t]he single most
important development occurred in 1956 with the creation of the Federal Aid
to Highways Act, which established the Interstate Highway System." 117 The
road network changed the market for oil and gas and the American orientation
toward our landscapes. "The building of the impressive road network across
the vastness of American space has accomplished more than spatial control; it
has been a fundamental reordering of the American economy and society." 118
The development of the vast highway network also immunized the American
public to recognizing and rejecting environmental destruction. "Road cuts
through hills exposed steep slopes to erosion; highways interrupted traditional
paths for wildlife; roadside vegetation allowed the introduction of nonnative
species." 119 This created a particular narrative of nature, environment, and the

113. Sabin, supra note 100, at 86--87.
114. Id. at 87.
115. Harvey K. Flad, Country Clutter: Visual Pollution and the Rural Roadscape, 553 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 117, 118 (1997).
116. Id. at 119.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 120.
119. Id.

2020]

PROPERTY THEORY & SUSTAINABILITY

115

proper future of development. Such narratives critically reinforce future
behaviors. 120
This is because"[ s]ocial constructions of nature reveal much about 'not just
the natural world but the human cultures that lend meaning and moral
imperatives to that world. "' 121
Additionally, the road network was a significant part of establishing
favored and disfavored areas of the country-the urban and rural divide that we
now speak of so easily and naturally as though it were an unforeseen product
of random human behaviors. 122 That creation of road accessible and

120. Katrina Schwartz has written about the power of these environmental narratives, examining
them in the context of post-communism environmental regulation. See KATRINA Z. S. SCHWARTZ,
NATURE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY AFTER COMMUNISM: GLOBALIZING THE ETHNOSCAPE 1 (2006).
Schwartz wrote that "each narrative in its heyday commands tremendous influence over perceptions
of nature and agendas for nature management." Id. at 4 . Schwartz explained, "Scholars in the
interdisciplinary field of political ecology have shown that those who control environmental narratives
also wield power over land and natural resources." Id. at 4-5.
121. Id. at 3 (quoting William Cronon, Introduction: In Search of Nature, in UNCOMMON
GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 23, 26 (William Cronon ed., 1996)).
122. Cultural perceptions of Appalachians developed to suit this rural-urban divide and to justify
environmental exploitation of the Appalachian Mountains in pursuit of coal. Appalachians were
approached by other whites with an "attitude ... of superiority and paternalism." DEBORAH VAN SAU
MCCAULEY, APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN RELIGION : A HISTORY 12 (1995). "[O]ther Americans
needed to see Appalachians as ignorant hillbillies in order not to feel guilty for having plundered our
timber and coal, wrecked our environment, and exploited our labor. Victors always portray the
vanquished in unflattering terms in order to rationalize their own brutality." Lisa Alther, Border States,
in BLOODROOT: REFLECTIONS ON PLACE BY APPALACHIAN WOMEN WRITERS 21, 27 (Joyce Dyer ed.,
1998). Ronald Eller, a key scholar of Appalachian history and sociology wrote that America's image
of Appalachia is "feuds, . .. stills, mine wars, environmental destruction, joblessness and human
depredation." Ronald D. Eller, Forward to BACK TALK FROM APPALACHIA: CONFRONTING
STEREOTYPES 3, 9 (Dwight B. Billings, Gurney Norman & Katherine Ledford eds., 1999). In the
American cultural norm, Appalachia became "a place where dirty children sat listlessly on the porches
of old shacks, a place that only existed in black and white." Anne Shelby, The "R" Word: What's So
Funny (and Not So Funny) About Redneck Jokes, in BACK TALK FROM APPALACHIA: CONFRONTING
STEREOTYPES, supra, at 153-54.
Such stereotypes culturally justify a world American and yet not American, a larger culture that
tolerates "injustice and exploitation .. . monopolization of land by absentee owners, political
domination, taxation inequalities, poor working conditions and low wages, deindustrialization,
environmental ruin, and social neglect." Dwight B. Billings, Appalachian Studies and the Sociology
of Appalachia, in 2 21ST CENTURY SOCIOLOGY: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 390, 394 (Clifton D.
Bryant & Dennis L. Peck eds., 2007).
As a result, even scholarship on these areas frequently reflects an extremely negative bias toward
rural inhabitants. Donald Davis explained one, relatively recent, example of this phenomenon:
Shelby Lee Adam's book Appalachian Portraits (Oxford: University of
Mississippi Press, 1993), is no exception.... Adams has given us another
macabre version of the region and its rural inhabitants. Almost all of his
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inaccessible areas would also support the more environmentally destructive
energy markets such as those for coal, oil, and natural gas.123
The fate of rural roadscapes in the twenty-first century hinges
on what changes may occur to the "two rural Americas"-the
rural-urban fringe regions near major metropolitan centers, and
the more remote, or "deep," rural areas far from regions of
economic growth and vitality. Planning for either of these two
rural landscapes will have to consider how to address the
economic and social forces at work nationally and regionally,
but an even more comprehensive view will require integrating
a concern for the natural and cultural landscapes as places to
live, work, and visit. If the landscape 124 mirrors the values of
photographs-which are admittedly technically and compositionally strikingborder on the grotesque. Adams gives little dignity to his subjects, showing them
in stereotypical poses, often with blank, mentally incapacitated facial expressions
and from angles that accentuate their peculiarity and marginality.
DAVIS, supra note 112, at 97.
123. There are no removals of goods such as coal, oil, and natural gas without impact. As
Wendell Berry put it, "The industrial economy thus is inherently violent. It impoverishes one place in
order to be extravagant in another, true to its colonialist ambition.... Industrialists are always ready
to ignore, sell, or destroy the past." Wendell Berry, The Agrarian Standard, in THE ESSENTIAL
AGRARIAN READER: THE FUTURE OF CULTURE, COMMUNITY, AND THE LAND 23, 26 (Norman Wirzba
ed., 2003). Additionally, these burdens fall more heavily on already disadvantaged populations. In
addition to raising concerns about exacerbating poverty, the geography of mining, oil, and natural gas
also places Native American populations at greater risk of taking the brunt of the negative
environmental consequences of these markets. Daniel Brook argued that the impact is so severe that
we should, in fact, regard these acts as environmental genocide. "In the modem era, these forms of
genocide have been superseded by a more insidious, and ultimately more destructive, form .
Environmental genocide is perpetrated by the U.S. government and by private corporations alike; some
of their methods are legal, while others are not." Daniel Brook, Environmental Genocide: Native
Americans and Toxic Waste, 57 AM. J. ECON. SOCIO. 105, 105 (1998). Brook explained, because of
the low socioeconomic level of Native Americans, "they are most at risk for toxic exposure." Id. The
link to poverty is obvious: "[D]isadvantages are multiplied by dependence on food supplies closely
tied to the land in which [toxic] materials ... have been shown to accumulate." Id. (quoting RON
GLASS, BY OUR OWN LIVES: MOVING THE FOUNDATION STONE OF RACISM (mimeo)).
Simultaneously, Native American populations find themselves unable to establish control over
these exploitations of resources, often within their own territorial lands. Sovereignty over reservation
resources remains limited. John S. Harbison, The Broken Promise Land: An Essay on Native American
Tribal Sovereignty over Reservation Resources, 14 STAN. ENV'T L.J. 347, 348--49 (1995).
124. Landscape itself is a contested concept. Kenneth Olwig argued "that much of the confusion
generated by these diverging approaches can be clarified by re-examining, in historical and
geographical context, the substantive meaning of landscape as a place of human habitation and
environmental interaction." Kenneth R. Olwig, Recovering the Substantive Nature ofLandscape, 86
ANNALS Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 630, 630 (1996). He focused specifically on the concept of
landscape, which he said "need not be understood as being either territory or scenery; it can also be
conceived as a nexus of community, justice, nature, and environmental equity, a contested territory
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that is as pertinent today as it was when the term entered the modern English language at the end of
the sixteenth century." Id. at 630-31.
Cosgrove suggested a similar interpretation of landscape. The scholar argued:
In geographical usage landscape is an imprecise and ambiguous concept whose
meaning has defied the many attempts to define it with the specificity generally
expected of a science. While landscape obviously refers to the surface of the
earth, or a part thereof, and thus to the chosen field of geographical enquiry, it
incorporates far more than merely the visual and functional arrangement of
natural and human phenomena which the discipline can identify, classify, map
and analyse. Landscape shares but extends the meaning of "area" or "region,"
both concepts which have been claimed as its geographical equivalents. As a
term widely employed in painting and imaginative literature as well as in
environmental design and planning, landscape carries multiple layers of meaning.
DENISE. COSGROVE, SOCIAL FORMATION AND SYMBOLIC LANDSCAPE 13 (1984).
Geographer David Delaney wrote about the social construction of key terms such as nature and
landscape and the relationship between those constructions and law, as it exists not only in statutes and
judicial opinions but also in cultural norms. In a seminal article on the topic, Delaney explained:
The primary objective of this article is to engage and extend the discussion within
geography on the social production or construction of nature through an
exploration of a particular and highly significant set of practices-those
associated with legal argument-through which such constructions are attempted
and provisionally accomplished. This article also extends the range of material
sites that are the objects of production beyond those usually treated by
geographers. I aim to examine episodes, not only in the social construction of
landscapes, but also of animals, human bodies, and "mind."
David Delaney, Making Nature/Marking Humans: Law as a Site of(Cultural) Production, 91 ANNALS
Ass'N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 487,487 (2001). Delaney argued, "Nature .. . is produced in a number of
cultural domains .. . . The representations and images that are crafted and put into circulation have
material consequences." Id. at 488 (citing BRUCE BRAUN & NOEL CASTREE, REMAKING REALITY:
NATURE AT THE MILLENNIUM ( 1998)). According to Delaney, "As ideological fragments or elements
of consciousness, they inform actions. They are part of seeing the material and social world in
particular ways and not others. They provide the basis for justification and critique, for business-asusual and resistance." Id. at 488. As a result, "like these other discourses, law may have a tendency
to read nature in light of a set of peculiar or local anxieties and concerns. The very idea of (modern,
liberal) law can be seen to be reliant on a particular conception of humanness." Id. (citing Andrew E.
Lelling, Comment, Eliminative Materialism, Neuroscience, and the Criminal Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1471 (1993); John Lawrence Hill, Law and the Concept of the Core Self: Toward a Reconciliation of
Naturalism and Humanism, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 289 (1997)). Delaney argued, "To the extent that
modem understandings of what it is to be human are dependent on particular conceptions of nature, it
is reasonable to suggest that legal discourse cannot be 'neutral' with respect to competing conceptions
of nature." Id. at 488. Therefore, "legal texts are significant artifacts through which we can glimpse
how conceptions of nature are contested, validated, repudiated, modified, and-more importantlydeployed by situated actors in countless ways." Id. at 489. Law's rule is key: "Attention to law
sharpens our awareness that control over the word, over meaning, over the terms of categorical
inclusion and exclusion, is strongly conducive to--ifnot determinative of---control over segments of
the material world that are given meaning by reference to categories." Id. Delaney explains:
To speak of law as "a site of cultural production or political contestation" is, of
course, shorthand for indicating the social projects and practices wherein nature
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a culture, then policies and implementation strategies that
focus on the aesthetics of transportation are surely significant
factors toward enhancing a higher quality of life. 125
If landscapes mirror social values, then rural America became the place that
citizens were happy to sacrifice to the markets for coal, oil, and natural gas.
This was not an accident but rather a foreseeable result of federal practices that
spent money on building the highway infrastructure and, simultaneously,
rejected other, more sustainable alternatives.
The critical insight from history then is the degree to which legal
mechanisms shape our energy markets, not just through regulation but also
through our interpretation of common law claims within tort, property, and
other fields. 126 Sabin explained, "One of the most important lessons from the
nation's oil history, then, is that there never has been a free market in energy.
Frankly, there never could be. Public choices inevitably shape the energy sector
through tax policy, property rights, labor law, and many other unavoidable
decisions." 127

and its surrogates and opposites are deployed in efforts to enlist the power of the
state to validate some versions in preference to other competing versions. The
question, then, is not what is nature, but what work does "nature" do in instances
oflegal rhetoric?
Id. at 490. In legal discourse, "Nature as a trope may signify, among other things, negativity, absence,
necessity, the determined, timelessness or pastness, order or disorder, wildness, essence, permanence,
and universality." Id.
125. Flad, supra note 115, at 128-29 (footnotes omitted).
126. Notably, without history, we may also misjudge some legal institutions and infer a more
ecologically favorable outcome or intent than, in fact, ever existed. A great example of this is the forest
laws of England:
A "forest" in the Middle Ages meant something quite different from how we think
of it today: It mainly existed for our medieval forbears as a legal entity, rather
than as an economic or ecological one. Therefore, a forest could actually include
treeless fields of arable or pasture if these came within the purview of property
rights and laws that defined it as such, according to the customs and traditions of
the locality.
JOHN ABERTH, AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE AGES: THE CRUCIBLE OF NATURE 87
(2013). Aberth explained, "The Weald, one of the largest blocks of uncleared woodland in AngloSaxon England, was nonetheless from the eighth century heavily exploited as woodland pasture,
mainly for pigs, a fact that is known from royal charters granted to ecclesiastical institutions for the
right of pannage." Id. at 88. "[I]t is quite evident that the main concern of crown policy was to exploit
the forest law for its revenue-raising potential and not necessarily for the sake of the best interests of
the woods themselves." Id. at 115.
127. Sabin, supra note 100, at 84.
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With an emphasis on possession and exclusion, traditional property law
supported the centuries of law without statutory environmental regulation. 128
During these years, the only source of environmental regulation was generally
property-tort claims such as trespass and nuisance. 129 Both trespass and
nuisance were uniquely situated for the task of bringing about environmental
regulation within an era when there is almost complete focus on the individual
as the center of property rights and very little sense of the social context for
those rights. In such a context, trespass and nuisance could act as limits on land
use precisely because suits were brought by neighboring, injured landowners.
In other words, the environmental regulation did not come from a centralized
source, vindicating rights for the general public, but instead from a similarly
situated private owner of land. Nuisance and trespass provided a way of
controlling one particularly badly-behaved neighbor.
Nuisance and trespass, of course, came with their limitations. Neither
effectuated a system of zoning, which would limit problematic land uses from
ever beginning, but instead the two causes of action worked as fixes to existing
problems. Each came with its own doctrinal limitations, including statutes of
limitation, 130 rules on entry, 131 and limited recognition of pollution as an injury
without demonstrating physical harm. 132
Although a few environmental statutes predate the environmental
movement of the 1960s, the bulk of environmental regulation went into place
within this era.133 Key statutory frameworks began to address water pollution,
air pollution, toxins, workplace safety, and other key issues. 134 Additionally,

128. In this time period, scholars tended to think less actively about the natural world,
particularly as a force with the power to shape our life experience. "In writing human history, scholars
have largely over-looked the role that nature has played in shaping American life and culture. Their
arrogance in exaggerating differences between humans and other organisms, between human history
and the natural environment, has created an enormous intellectual gap in our present understanding of
the human condition."
DONALD EDWARD DAVIS, WHERE THERE ARE MOUNTAINS: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTHERN APPALACHIANS 201 (2000).
129. Mark Latham, Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, The Intersection of Tort and
Environmental Law: Where the Twains Should Meet and Depart, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 737, 737
(2011) ("Tort law has historically provided the principal mechanism for remedying harms to the
environment.").
130. See Osborne M . Reynolds Jr., Distinguishing Trespass and Nuisance: A Journey Through
a Shifting Borderland, 44 OKLA. L. REV. 227,244 (1991).
131. Id. at 235-43.
132. See, e.g., John P . S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution-Some Lessons
from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 155, 157 (1983).
133. See Sarah T. Phillips, Environmental History, in AMERICAN HISTORY NOW 285 , 306 (Eric
Foner & Lisa McGirr eds., 2011 ).
134. Id.
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zoning became more and more common at the city and county level, which
served to move less favorable land uses to areas of towns away from housing.135
Such more intense regulation of land use was not entirely consistent with
the earlier understanding of property, which had emphasized the individual as
the sole party in control of the use of private property. By refocusing property
away from the individual's rights and toward the idea of property as a set of
social relationships, property theory supported the development of a more
extensive set of environmental regulations. Focusing on social relationships
allowed property rights to be rearticulated as contingent on greater social goods
such as air and water quality.
IV. THE FAILURE OF PROGRESSIVE AND MODERN PROPERTY THEORY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE EROSION OF TORTS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROBLEMS

A. Why Torts Matter in the Era of Statutory Environmental Regulation

Federal and state environmental statutes changed the propertyenvironmental law relationship substantially. In doing so, however, the statutes
did not entirely erode the role of tort claims such as nuisance and trespass.
Those basic common law claims continue to play an important role in
maintaining environmental protections.
Some scholars have argued for a narrower role for torts in the context of
environmental issues. 136 More commonly, scholars have seen tort claims as
continuing to play a substantial role in environmental regulation. David
Westbrook, for example, cites tort claims as one of the three central components
of environmental law. Westbrook explains, "Environmental law is organized
around three fundamental approaches to environmental problems: (i) common
law actions (tort, particularly nuisance); (ii) the governmental aggregation of
externalities whose harms are valued below the costs of their contractual
resolution or judicial prosecution (administration); and (iii) the establishment
of markets in order to achieve societal ends (constructed markets, such as those
envisaged by the Clean Air Act)." 137 There are a number of reasons scholars
continue to see torts as a key part of environmental regulation. As Lynda
135. See John Mangin, The New Exclusionary Zoning, 25 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 91, 91-92,
99-100 (2014).
136. Latham, Schwartz & Appel, supra note 129, at 773 (concluding that the line between torts
and environmental law should be narrowly drawn and that "[w]here there is overlap, traditional tort
law principles, as outlined in this Article, can result in statutory and common law working in
harmony").
137. David A. Westbrook, Liberal Environmental Jurisprudence, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 619,
621 (1994).
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Collins has observed, "First, notwithstanding its size and clout, statutory
environmental law sometimes proves inadequate" and in some cases "tort may
be the only means to provide redress to injured victims and deter environmental
wrongdoing. Second, even where a strong regulatory regime exists, tort's
unique characteristics enable it to supplement, and in some cases even
outperform, statutory environmental law." 138
That said, nuisance law is not the heart of environmental law. Yet, a better
understanding of nuisance law can help us understand the relationship between
property and environmental law. It might have been, but for the reasons
detailed in the remainder of this Part, nuisance law is being eroded. It is less
powerful than it used to be for multiple reasons. One of these-which I will
address later-stems from the more community focused view of property. The
other-which I will address here-emerges from the odd situation of nuisance
at the boundary between property and tort law. Two critical transformations
have happened in nuisance law in recent decades. If nuisance law does indeed
have an important role to play in environmental law, these transformations
matter especially because they may make nuisance law less able to address
environmental concerns effectively. First, social utility moved from being a
discretionary injunction factor to a part of the basic case for public and private
nuisance. This removed remedies for many plaintiffs and made the prima facie
case much more difficult to prove. Second, the Restatement of Torts has pushed
various claims at the property-tort line (like nuisance and premises liability)
more toward torts and less property. 139 The outcome of this push is less strict
liability, more negligence. I have previously criticized the rise of the tort view
of nuisance-meaning that proving a claim would require proving negligent
behavior. 140 This stands out in sharp contrast to the property view of nuisance,
which focuses not on the behavior that caused the problem but on the impacts
to the neighboring property. In such a model, intent is not particularly
important, but land values are. The odd placement of nuisance at the
intersection of tort and property has befuddled scholars for years.
Tort and property form two of the largest and most central fields of law,
and yet we remain unable to define with precision the outlines and foundations

138. Lynda M. Collins, Strange Bedfellows? The Precautionary Principle and Toxic Tort: A Tort
Paradigm for the 21st Century, 35 ENV'TL. REP . NEWS &ANALYSIS 10361, 10362 (2005).
139. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 343,822 (AM. LAW INST. 1965, 1979).
140. Jill M . Fraley, Liability for Unintentional Nuisances: How the Restatement of Torts
Almost Negligently Killed the Right to Exclude in Property Law, 121 W . VA. L. REV . 419,458
(2018).
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of either concept. 141 Henry Smith describes our impatience with this situation,
finding that "[m]ost of us have a sense that property is doing something
important, but it does it in a somewhat mysterious way." 142 Approaching the
question from the torts perspective, Nicholas McBride finds that "[t]he vast
amount of academic writing on the nature and basis of tort law that has been
produced in the last few decades is . .. a sign of sickness," indicating that we
are incapable of understanding tort law. 143 Indeed, McBride concludes that, by
the early 1990s, "the community of tort academics was stuck firmly in the
wildemess." 144 If we were lost by the mid-1990s, recent encounters with
climate change have only revealed how much we struggle with central concepts
such as harm, causation, and responsibility in tort. 145 Having failed to define
either property or tort to our satisfaction, we struggle all the more when we try
to articulate their boundaries.
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed proposed demarcating this
boundary by distinguishing between property and liability rules. 146 Their
seminal article on the subject focused on how entitlements change hands,
explaining how the level of protection received by the entitlement depends on
whether property or liability rules are applied.147 If an entitlement is protected
by a property rule, it will change hands only through consent of the owner. 148
If an entitlement is only protected by a liability rule, then it can be taken without
the owner's consent, so long as a collectively set price is paid to the owner. 149
Calabresi and Melamed then elaborated circumstances that would encourage
choosing one set of rules over the other, focusing on an economic perspective,
which prioritizes the efficiency of exchanges. 150
Thus, when it came to elaborating the property-tort divide, Calabresi and
Melamed's scheme focused on the remedies, or "the manner in which
entitlements are protected," as a primary point of distinction between property
141. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1105 (1972)(illuminating first
the intertwined problems of defining property and tort). Calabresi and Melamed note that prior to their
article, property and torts were very rarely approached from any unified perspective. Id.
142. Henry E . Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in
American Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 959 (2009).
143. Nicholas J. McBride, Rights and the Basis of Tort Law, in RIGHTS AND PRIVATE LAW 331,
333 (Donal Nolan & Andrew Robertson eds., 2012).
144. Id.
145. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do about Tort Law, 41 ENV'T L. 1, I (2011).
146. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 141 , at 1092.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1106-07.
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rules and tort rules. 151 Property remedies (i.e. injunctions and supracompensatory remedies) made taking the entitlement effectively impossible or
set the remedy so high that taking would be illogical. 152 Such remedies
emphasized the quintessential property characteristic of the owner's right to
exclude. On the other hand, liability rules allowed for violation of the owner's
right to exclude. Remedies did not punish so much as set compensation at a
collectively determined price. As a result, liability rules provided some relief
against the "holdout" problem of a single owner refusing to sell and preventing
a larger socially valued project from proceeding. 153 Liability rules would be
less attractive than property rules due to the procedural costs but would allow
for non-consensual takings. The two rules then align with the basic setup of
property rules as focused on protecting entitlements and allowing takings only
in the narrowest of circumstances and tort rules as focused on compensating
when a taking has occurred accidentally or must occur to facilitate another
social good.
Calabresi and Melamed's article has remained a central point of discussion
since publication. 154 Yet, scholars have never been comfortable accepting that
the property versus liability rules framework fully and accurately articulates the
property-tort divide. Richard Epstein concludes that Calabresi and Melamed
failed to point us in any direction for systematically determining when property
or liability rules should prevail. 155 Lee Anne Fennell argues that a failure to
distinguish between risk and harm in applying Calabresi and Melamed's
framework leads scholars to distort our understanding of the relationship
between property and torts. 156 This past year, Calabresi again highlighted this
issue by tackling the problem of the "resurgence of torts viewed as a purely
private legal arrangement," and arguing for a "public meaning" of torts via
liability rules that are collectively set. 157
151. Id at 1092.
152. See id at 1106--08.
153. See id at 1107-09.
154. See generally Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights, 95
YALE L.J. 1335 (1986); Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability
and Related Doctrines, 60 U . CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993); James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property
Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N .Y.U. L. REV . 440 (1995); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shaven, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 713 (1996); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719 (2004).
155. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View ofthe Cathedral: The Dominance ofProperty Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091, 2092 (1997).
156. Lee Anne Fennell, Property and Half-Torts, 116 YALE L.J. 1400, 1400 (2007).
157. Guido Calabresi, A Broader View of the Cathedral: The Significance of the Liability Rule,
Correcting a Misapprehension, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 4 (2014). For a taxonomy of the private
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At the moment, progress in elaborating the property-tort divide does not
look particularly promising. A recent focus in property theory on the
relationship between property and morality has deemphasized the problem of
the property-tort divide. When elaborating a theory of property and morality,
Merrill and Smith argue that the relationship between the two had been
obscured in scholarship. 158 One of the reasons the authors cite is the law and
economics approaches that have blossomed since Calabresi and Melamed's
article. 159 Another factor may be that articles following their lead have focused
much more on liability rules than on property rules, and therefore have been
less conscious about articulating the implications of their arguments for the
property-tort divide. 160
The property-tort divide matters particularly within the context of this
Article. If we begin with the basic premise that property theory informs and
provides a foundation for law itself, both in common law and statutory forms,
then to the degree that judges and scholars think of nuisance as a tort claim
rather than a property claim, they may be more likely to think in terms of central
torts concepts such as harm and negligence rather than in terms of property
theory concepts such as possession and exclusion. It is only by making sure
that property retains its claim on nuisance law that we can ensure that property
theory is critically effective as an instrument of change.

B. Courts Integrate Community with Social Utility
Social utility is a legal concept introduced within the nineteenth century to
address the social benefits of an action that may otherwise be actionable.
Specifically, social utility described the positive externalities or aspects of an
action or land use that had significant negative externalities. Social utility is
particularly important when thinking about property theory because social
utility is a concept rooted in social relations.
Courts worked out their concepts of social utility within the context of
nuisance cases. For example, in York v. Stallings, 161 the court said that
"[a]lthough [it] found that the fallout of sawdust and cinders on plaintiffs
premises and the noise at night entitled plaintiff to some relief," against the
or individual rights views of property, see Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L.
REV. 847, 856-63 (2013).
158. Merrill & Smith, supra note 1, at 1849.
159. Id.
160. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 Nw. U. L. REV.
1823, 1828-29 (2009) (describing the influence of liability rules via damage awards); Calabresi &
Melamed, supra note 141, at 1105; George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV.
L. REV. 537 (1972).
161. York v. Stallings, 341 P.2d 529 (Or. 1959).
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operation of defendant's lumber mill, "it [did] not follow that an injunction
should issue as a matter of course," because the "court may refuse an injunction
in certain cases where the hardship caused to the defendant by the injunction
would greatly outweigh the benefit resulting to the plaintiff." 162 The court
found evidence of the fallout but could not determine sufficiently its amount
and frequency.163 The court adopted the Restatement of Torts position that
embraced considering hardship to the defendant when granting injunctions.164
Similarly, in Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co.,165 the court faced the
problem of how to balance the equities in the context of a nuisance action. The
court reasoned:
According to the doctrine of "comparative injury" or
"balancing of equities" the court will consider the injury which
may result to the defendant and the public by granting the
injunction as well as the injury to be sustained by the
complainant if the writ be denied. If the court finds that the
injury to the complainant is slight in comparison to the injury
caused the defendant and the public by enjoining the nuisance,
relief will ordinarily be refused. It has been pointed out that
the cases in which a nuisance is permitted to exist under this
doctrine are based on the stem rule of necessity rather than on
the right of the author of the nuisance to work a hurt, or injury
to his neighbor. The necessity of others may compel the
injured party to seek relief by way of an action at law for
damages rather than by a suit in equity to abate the nuisance.166
As a result, the court stated:
Some one must suffer these inconveniences rather than that the
public interest should suffer.... These conflicting interests
call for a solution of the question by the application of the
broad principles of right and justice, leaving the individual to
his remedy by compensation and maintaining the public
interests intact; this works hardships on the individual, but they
are incident to civilization with its physical developments,
demanding more and more the means of rapid transportation of
persons and property. 167
A nineteenth century Alabama case provides a bit of contrast. In Clifton
Iron Co. v. Dye, the court reversed injunctive relief in favor of an adjoining
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 534.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 534.
Storey v. Central Hide & Rendering Co., 226 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. 1950).
Id. at 618-19.
Id. at 619.
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landowner for the pollution of his stream by iron ore washing operations. 168
The injunction was improper because the lower court should have taken notice
of the very large investments in mining, which necessarily involves washing of
ores, and therefore sediment flowing into streams.169 The court recognized the
injury to the landowner via sediment pollution, and his right to damages, but
concluded that an injunction decision must take into account the public
interest. 170
J.n. Johnson v. Independent School District., 171 the court addressed a septic
tank. Recognizing that defendant school district's septic tank constituted a
nuisance as to an adjoining landowner upon whose land the overflow was
passed, the court said that the general rule, as supported by the weight of
authorities, seemed to be that "when the issuance of an injunction [would] cause
serious public inconvenience or loss without a correspondingly great advantage
to the complainant no injunction [would] be granted. " 172 "Injunctions are never
granted," said the court, "when they are against good conscience, or productive
of hardship, oppression, injustice or public or private mischief." 173 The court
continued:
It seems to be well established that whenever an injunction is
asked of a court of equity in cases of this nature . .. [the court]
must take into consideration not only the dry, strict rights of
the plaintiff and defendant, but must have regard to the
surrounding circumstances-to the rights and interests of other
persons which may be more or less involved, which, in the
instant case, would be every citizen of the defendant school
district. 174
J.n. Heppenstall Co. v. Berkshire Chemical Co., 175 the court addressed a
castor bean processing facility. While the defendant's processing of castor
beans was found to constitute a nuisance, the court nevertheless refused to grant
an adjoining factory owner injunctive relief, noting that both castor oil and
nitrogen were
[H]ighly essential in modem war; that the defendant's plant
[was] one of three such plants in the United States and [was]
under army supervision as to the production of the oil; that the
168. Clifton Iron Co. v. Dye, 6 So. 192, 193 (Ala. 1889).
169. Id
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id
Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist., 199 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 1947).
Id at 424.
Id (citing Johnson v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 127 S.W. 63 (Mo. 1910)).
Id
Heppenstall Co. v. Berkshire Chem. Co., 35 A.2d 845 (Conn. 1944).
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defendant [had] exhausted every means to lessen the
emanation of the dust from its plant; that it [had] removed its
machinery for grinding the castor bean[s]; that the only further
means to prevent the dust [was] to stop the processing of the
bean[s]; and that it would require six months to a year to
remove the plant to another location .. . and would entail
considerable expense.176
The West Virginia Supreme Court addressed social utility in 1940. In
Board of Commissioners. v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 177 the court ruled on a
mining nuisance case. Enjoining as a public nuisance certain activities of a
mining company with respect to its maintenance of a burning pile of refuse
materials taken from the mine, the court said that "[ e]ven in as useful and
important an industry as the mining of coal, an incidental consequence, such as
here involved, cannot be justified or permitted unqualifiedly, if the health of the
public [were] impaired thereby." 178 The court said that "[n]otwithstanding a
business [is] conducted in [a] regular manner, yet if in the operation thereof it
is shown by facts and circumstances to constitute a nuisance affecting public
health 'no measure of necessity, usefulness or public benefit will protect it from
the unflinching condemnation of the law."' 179 The court continued that the
comparative injury doctrine should be applied with great caution in nuisance
cases, even though not involving public health; "[w ]ith all the more reason,"
said the court, "there is [an] extremely narrow basis for undertaking to balance
conveniences where people's health is involved." 180
Such cases as these provided the context for adopting the social utility
concept in other areas of law. This spread began in the mid-twentieth century
but is accelerating in recent years.
C. The Spread ofSocial Utility through the Tort Causes ofAction

Social utility initially informed the court's analysis of the equities when
determining whether to grant an injunction in a nuisance case. Unsurprisingly,
most of the cases addressing social utility were land use cases where the land
use at issue produced pollution, but also other community goods such as jobs
and tax dollars. The use of social utility analysis has expanded significantly
within the context of nuisance claims. Notably, however, social utility has
spread throughout tort claims more generally. This Section tracks the
176.
177.
178.
179.
1893)).
180.

Idat847.
Bd. ofComm'rs v. Elm Grove Mining Co., 9 S.E.2d 813 (W. Va. 1940).
Id at 817.
Id (quoting H .G . WOOD,APRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF N UISANCES 41 (3d. ed.

Id
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continuing expansion of social utility analysis throughout a variety of tort
claims.

i.

Premises Liability

For premises liability, the court considers social utility when determining
whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous. This risk-utility balancing test
includes four factors: (1) the utility of the things; (2) the likelihood and
magnitude of the harm, which includes the obviousness and apparentness of the
condition; (3) the cost of preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the
plaintiffs activities in terms of its social utility or whether it is dangerous by
nature. Other courts do a balancing: decide whether the social value and utility
of the hazard outweigh, and thus justify its potential harm to others.
The first reported cases using social utility as a legal concept when
evaluating the claim began in the 1970s.181 Notably, use of the concept was
sporadic for decades but has been rising in reported cases since approximately
2010.
Louisiana has applied social utility to two recent premises liability cases.
In Pryor v. Iberia Parish School Board, the plaintiff brought a premises liability
action against the school board for damages suffered as result of a fall on
bleachers at stadium owned by board. 182 The court described the test for
premises liability saying, "In determining whether a defect presents an
unreasonable risk of harm, the trier of fact must balance the gravity and risk of
harm against the individual and societal rights and obligations, the social utility,
and the cost and feasibility ofrepair." 183 Additionally, the court explained that
social utility was a part of the relevant balancing test:
In determining whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous,
courts have adopted a risk-utility balancing test. This test
encompasses four factors: (1) the utility of the thing[s]; (2) the
likelihood and magnitude of harm, which includes the
obviousness and apparentness of the condition; (3) the cost of
preventing the harm; and (4) the nature of the plaintiffs
activities in terms of its social utility, or whether it is dangerous
by nature. 184
Notably, the court cited a lack of clarity on how social utility factored into
the test for premises liability: "Our jurisprudence has not been entirely

181. See Furrer v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 466 P.2d 605 (Or. 1970) (applying social utility within
the context of a property damage claim).
182. See Pryor v. Iberia Par. Sch. Bd., 60 So. 3d 594 (La. 2011).
183. Id. at 596.
184. Id. at 597.
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consistent on this point." 185 There is language in Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
suggesting the "trier of fact must decide whether the social value and utility of
the hazard outweigh, and thus justify, its potential harm to others." 186 However,
other decisions focused on the social utility of the thing as a whole,
notwithstanding the presence of the defect. 187
After establishing the test, the court applied the test to the facts of the case,
which involved the injury on the bleachers. 188 The court found:
For purposes of the first factor, it is undisputed that the
bleachers serve a social utility purpose by providing seating for
patrons of the stadium. However, in a brief to this court,
plaintiff argues we should focus on the hazard which caused
her injury-the eighteen-inch gap between the first and second
seat-which she claims provides no social utility. 189
The second Louisiana case is Dowdy v. City of Monroe.190 In Dowdy, the
court explained:
There is no fixed rule for determining whether the thing
presents an unreasonable risk of harm. The trier of fact must
balance the gravity and risk of harm against the individual and
societal rights and obligations, the social utility, and the cost
and feasibility of repair. Simply put, the trier of fact must
decide whether the social value and utility of the hazard
outweigh, and thus justify its potential harm to others.191
The court further reasoned:
In determining the reasonableness of a risk, the court must
consider the broad range of social, economic and moral factors
and the social utility of the plaintiffs conduct at the time of the
accident. ... One cannot be protected from all risks. The court

185. Id.
186. Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 708 So. 2d 362,365 (La. 1998) (citing W. PAGE KEETON,
DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 31 (5th ed. 1984)).
187. See Dauzat v. Curnest Guillot Logging, Inc., 995 So. 2d 1184, 1187 (La. 2008) ("[I]t is
undisputed that the logging road has a strong social utility for purposes of the first factor, as it is the
only method for removing harvested timber from Lake Pearl's land."); Boyle v. Bd. of Supervisors,
La. State Univ., 685 So. 2d 1080, 1083 (La. 1997) ("The utility of sidewalks on university campuses
is clear as pointed out by the court of appeal."); Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585,591 (La. 1996)
("We begin our analysis by examining the utility of the light pole.").
188. Pryor, 60 So. 3d at 596.
189. Id. at 597.
190. Dowdy v. City of Monroe, 78 So. 3d 791 (La. Ct. App. 2011).
191. Id. at 794-95 (citing Reed, 708 So. 2d 362).
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must decide what risks are unreasonable. 192
ii. Negligence

From the 1990s forward a number of cases include social utility as a part of
a negligence analysis. The trier of fact must balance the gravity and risk of
harm against the individual and societal rights and obligations, the social utility,
and the cost and feasibility of repair.
In Althaus v. Cohen, 193 the court addressed the duty of care in the context
of health. With respect to the appropriate rule to apply, the court held:
The determination of whether a duty exists in a particular case
involves the weighing of several discrete factors which
include: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social
utility of the actor's conduct; (3) the nature of the risk imposed
and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the consequences
of imposing a duty upon the actor; and (5) the overall public
interest in the proposed solution. 194
The court found that a trier of fact "must weigh the social utility of Dr.
Cohen's actions against the nature of the risk and foreseeability ofharm." 195 In
this particular context, the court noted the need for the particular treatment
provided by the practice. 196 The court observed that "[t]he need for prevention
of child abuse is unquestionable, as is the importance of adequate psychological
treatment for children who have been sexually abused." 197 Similarly, the court
noted, "[T]herapists who treat sexually abused children perform a valuable and
useful activity to society." 198 When thinking in terms of social utility, the court
found that "social utility disfavors expanding therapists' duty of care to nonpatients, especially where the non-patients are the accused victimizers.
However, we must also weigh this factor against the potential risk and
foreseeability of harm stemming from improper treatment for children who
have been sexually abused." 199 The court ultimately concluded: "[A]fter
weighing the social utility of effective therapeutic treatment for the child
192. Id at 795 (citing Graves v. Page, 703 So. 2d 566 (La. 1997); Oster v. Dep't ofTransp. &
Dev., 582 So. 2d 1285 (La. 1991)).
193. Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 2000).
194. Id at 1169; see also Bird v. W.C.W., 868 S.W.2d 767, 769 (Tex. 1994) ("In determining
whether to impose a duty, this Court must consider the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury
weighed against the social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding
against the injury and the consequences of placing that burden on the actor.").
195. Althaus, 756 A.2d at 1170.
196. Id
197. Id
198. Id
199. Id
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against the nature and foreseeability of the harm, we find that these factors
weigh against imposing a duty of care to non-patients upon a therapist who
treats sexually abused children." 200
Beckham v. Jungle Gym, L.L.C., 201 similarly applies social utility in the
context of negligence. Beckham was a slip and fall negligence case.202 In
beginning the analysis, the court noted their predicament: "There [was] no fixed
rule for determining whether the thing presents an unreasonable risk of
harm. " 203 Instead, the "trier of fact must balance the gravity and risk of harm
against the individual and societal rights and obligations, the social utility, and
the cost and feasibility ofrepair."204 Additionally, the "trier of fact must decide
whether the social value and utility of the hazard outweigh, and thus justify its
potential harm to others."205 The court further noted:
With the "mixed questions of law and fact" present for the
examination for an unreasonable risk of harm, the legal side of
that inquiry suggests that unpaved parking lots are expected to
have variations and irregularities in their surfaces in providing
social utility in many settings. From the factual side of the
inquiry, however, a particular irregularity might be weighed by
the trier-of-fact and found out of the ordinary so that a person
might experience an unsuspected change in surface causing a
fall. Thus, while loose gravel might be expected to be a feature
that would seldom, if ever, present an unreasonable risk of
harm, larger materials included on the surface mifht be less
stable, posing an unsuspected trip or slip hazard."20
In this particular case, the court ultimately concluded:
The mixed question of law and fact there required facts to be
weighed, allowing for the possibility of differing fact
assessments and a genuine issue of material fact. While a
gravel parking lot is generally better understood and its social
utility clearly known, the particular facts of this parking lot will
in our opinion be better assessed at a trial on the merits for the
determination of whether an unreasonable risk of harm was
present. 207

200.
201.
202.
203 .
204.
205 .
206.
207.

Id
Beckham v. Jungle Gym, L.L.C., 37 So. 3d 564 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
at 566.
at 568.

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

(citing Reed v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 708 So. 2d 362 (La. 1998)).
at 569.
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Williams v. Jones 208 involved, again, a fall and a claim of negligence. The
court began by observing that the Louisiana Supreme Court has explained the
following (in another case-the Reed case cited in this footnote):
The unreasonable risk of harm criterion entails a myriad of
considerations and cannot be applied mechanically .... The
concept, which requires a balancing of the risk and utility of
the condition, is not a simple rule of law which can be applied
mechanically to the facts of the case .. . . Because of the
plethora of factual questions and other considerations
involved, the issue necessarily must be resolved on a case-bycase basis. 209
Here, the court concluded:
The fact an accident occurred because of a defect does not
elevate the condition of the thing to that of an unreasonably
dangerous defect. The defect must be of such a nature as to
constitute a dangerous condition that would be reasonably
expected to cause injury to a prudent person using ordinary
care under the circumstances. 210
iii. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

From the 1980s forward, some cases include social utility as a part of the
analysis of claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Mallozzi
v. Philadelphia Daily Newspapers, Inc.,2 11 the court examined a newspaper's
social utility. The court concluded that "[i]n holding that reasonable minds
could not find defendants' conduct sufficiently outrageous, the court should
consider the social utility of newspaper reporting."212
Similarly, in Lucas v. Firine, 213 a Connecticut Superior Court found that
"[l]iability exists only 'for conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by
decent society, of a nature which is especially calculated to cause, and does

208. Williams v. Jones, 34 So. 3d 926 (La. Ct. App. 2010).
209. Id. at 931 (quoting Reed, 708 So. 2d at 364).
210. Id. (citing Lasyone v. Kansas City Southern R.R., 786 So. 2d 682,694 (La. 2001)).
211. Mallozzi v. Philadelphia Daily Newspapers, Inc., 23 Pa. D. & C.3d 761, 761 (Pa. D. & C.
1981).
212. Id. at 764 (citing Knierim v. Izzo, 174 N.E.2d 157, 164 (Ill. 1961)) ("drawing a line between
slight hurts common to a complex society and severe mental disturbances resulting from intentional
acts wholly lacking in social utility"); Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 151 (Pa. 1963) (finding
that this tort is designed for acts of an especially flagrant character, as opposed to conduct having social
value).
213 . Lucas v. Firine, No. CV 92-0335703, 1993 WL 280306, at *l (Conn. Super. Ct. July 15,
1993).
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cause mental distress of a very serious kind. "'214 The court focused on the
purpose of the conduct at issue in terms of its social utility: "[A] line can be
drawn between the slight hurts which are the price of a complex society and the
severe mental disturbances inflicted by intentional actions wholly lacking in
social utility."215 Focusing on social utility, the court made it a limitation on
emotional distress claims: "Liability has been found only where the conduct
has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond
all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community."216
iv. Invasion of Privacy

A 1963 case presents a rather different use of the social utility concept. In
a case for invasion of privacy-where a woman was followed, her whereabouts
noted, and her movements filmed-the court stated that such conduct is
reasonable because it believed that there was much social utility to be gained
from investigations for personal injury.217 InForsterv. Manchester, 218 the court
held that there was "much social utility to be gained from these
investigations."219 The court reasoned that "[i]t is in the best interests of society
that valid claims be ascertained and fabricated claims be exposed."220
The court further justified this position by pointing to an act of the
legislature:
The legislature recognized the importance of these
investigative activities in the Private Detective Act of 1953
when it defined the business of a licensed private detective to
include investigations of the "identity, habits, conduct,
movements, whereabouts ... of any person" and, in another
subsection when it authorized the "securing of evidence to be
used ... in the trial of civil ... cases." 221
Relying on the act for a social utility, the court explained that "[c]ertainly,
following the subject during her daily activities and recording on film her
movements and whereabouts is consonant with the wording of the Act and

214. Id. (quoting Whelan v. Whelan, 588 A.2d 251,253 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991)).
215. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Knierim, 174 N.E.2d at 164).
216. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS§ 46 cmt.
d (AM. L. INST. 1965)).
217. Forster, 189 A.2d at 150.
218. Id. at 147.
219. Id. at 150.
220. Id.
221. Id. (quoting Private Detective Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 1273, § 2(b)(2), (10), 22 P.S.
§ 12(b)(2), (10)).
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aforementioned social purpose."222 The court was careful to also observe that
"[t]here was nothing unreasonable in the manner in which appellant was
followed nor in the taking of motion pictures. In regard to the surveillance, it
was conducted by experienced investigators who did not use improper
techniques." 223
The court held that "the social value resulting from
investigations of personal injury claims and the absence of any willfulness on
the part of appellee require[d] [it] to deny redress in this case."224

v. Wrongful Death
From the 1990s, wrongful death actions in multiple jurisdictions include an
analysis of social utility of the actions at issue. For wrongful death complaints,
to determine whether a duty exists requires that a court consider various factors
including the risk involved, the foreseeability of harm as weighed against the
social utility of the actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding
against the harm, and the consequences of placing the burden upon the actor.
In Campbell v. Burt Toyota-Diahatsu, Inc. ,225 the court addressed a problem
of an alleged failure to warn. The court explained:
We first consider the foreseeability of harm resulting from
Burt's failure to warn the Campbells that the modified seatbelt
posed a danger to them as weighed against the social utility of
imposing a legal duty on Burt to warn against such danger
when it was already known to the Campbells or should have
been known.226
The court found that even ifit assumed "that the foreseeability of harm resulting
from a seat-belt modification was great, it [was] outweighed here by the lack of
social utility in imposing a legal duty on Burt to warn of a safety hazard that
was known or should have been known to the Campbells."227 The court
concluded, "The safety of automobiles is of great concern, and maintaining safe
vehicles serves an important social function. Repair shops such as Burt's serve
that function for most of the public."228 In summary, the court held that "the
social utility of not imposing a legal duty on Burt to warn of an obvious danger
outweigh[ed] the foreseeability of harm in this case." 229

222.
223 .
224.
225 .
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id
Id
Id at 152.
Campbell v. Burt Toyota-Diahatsu, Inc., 983 P.2d 95 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).

Id at 97.
Id
Id at 97-98.
Id at 98.
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D. Social Utility, Community, and the Problem ofDefinition

The expansion of social utility throughout the many common law tort
claims holds a significant risk for environmental law for three distinct reasons.
First, social utility interjects a pro-defendant slant into tort cases. In other
words, social utility analyses, when added to a tort analyses, will weigh in favor
of defendants and make it more difficult for plaintiffs to win claims, however
meritorious those claims are. This is particularly important in the context of
the intersection of torts and environmental law.
Environmental law lacks one significant feature at the federal levelstatutes almost never provide for any individual remedies for plaintiffs who
have been harmed by violation of the statutes. In other words, if a plaintiff has
developed a lung disease as a result of a toxin, which was released from a
neighboring manufacturing facility, the plaintiff will need to file a common law
action to be compensated for the injury. Social utility, however, may bar those
plaintiffs from a successful claim, resulting in a justice gap for those plaintiffs.
Second, social utility is largely undefined and left to the whims of
individual courts. There is no standardized definition. Because social utility
rose as a method of considering equities, it was never intended to have a specific
definition. It was meant to be used contextually to sort out the various factors
that might be relevant to an inquiry by a court sitting in equity. In the modem
context, however, there is a great deal of risk to having social utility undefined.
One can easily regard social utility as a value that fits with modem property
theory. Social utility is about community goods and social relationships around
property. At the same time, social utility will consistently favor defendants as
it has been interpreted in the courts. When the courts tally social utility in terms
of the jobs created, the tax dollars for the community, the GDP of the country,
etc., those things are always going to favor a corporate or industrial defendant
rather than an injured individual neighbor. That's how social utility works
within the cases. Because social utility is undefined, it tends to be defined in
terms of those things that are easily counted within a community: jobs, incomes,
and tax dollars. Sustainability doesn't generally compete well in that field
because it cannot be reduced to concrete numbers for this tax year.
Third, social utility can be evaluated at any scale the judge chooses to
consider. What scale do we use for evaluating benefits? Local? State?
National? Unsurprisingly, benefits of a particular land use are often drastically
different at those scales. And law has a bad habit of ignoring scale or treating
jurisdiction (state and federal) as the answer to the question.
Consider, for example, the history of the Tennessee Valley Authority's
(TVA) mission and the environmental consequences of the agency in the
twentieth century. When the TVA was founded, the original mission focused
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on the local area and the provision of hydroelectricity. 230 Additionally, the
original mission was a highly socialist manifesto of addressing poverty in the
lower Appalachian Mountains. 231 The game plan was to take electricity and
utility coops to those who didn't have them. At the same time, the statute
mentioned plans for national replication of this experiment. 232 But with the rise
of socialism as a threat before and during World War II, the agency
reformulated its priorities. The agency dropped any interest in Appalachian
poverty and refocused its efforts on the national defense. 233 In the process, the
agency switched to coal-powered plants and the purchase of millions of tons of
strip-mined coal from the region. 234 Between the purchase of strip-mined coal
and the pollution created by the coal-fired power plants (both in terms of air
pollution and coal ash releases), the TVA became one of the greatest
environmental threats to the region. And this was an agency whose mission
was once clean hydroelectric power and poverty relief. What changed? Scale.
The original mission did not define scale well, and the agency changed the scale
for self-preservation with the rise of the World War II threat.
Social utility presents exactly the same problem in many ways. To the
degree that there is no set scale for evaluating utility, a judge is free to evaluate
in any way. And the larger one evaluates utility, the less important local
environmental impacts become. Of course, you can imagine how malleable
social utility is and how much it fits with corporate and political norms, such as
job creation and tax revenue.
Enough social benefits and the plaintiff may not even be able to prove
nuisance now, when the same case would have been decided differently
traditionally.
V. FORMULATING A SUSTAINABLE PROPERTY THEORY
In the social sciences, many researchers have moved to a methodology
known as grounded theory. Grounded theory comes from the work of Barney
Glaser and Anselm Strauss. 235 Grounded theory originates in qualitative
sources, specifically actual experiences.236 In the context of law, grounded

230. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., TVA TODAY 1, 7 (1975).
231. Id. at 1.
232. Id. at 2.
233. TENN.VALLEY AUTH. INFO. OFF., TENN.VALLEY AUTH., A HISTORY OF THE TENNESSEE
VALLEY AUTHORITY 19 (1983).
234. TENN. VALLEY AUTH., supra note 230, at 42.
235 . See generally BARNEY G . GLASER & ANSELM L. STRAUSS, THE DISCOVERY OF
GROUNDED THEORY: STRATEGIES FOR QUALITATIVE RESEARCH (1967).
236. Id.
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theory serves to remind us of the importance of the cases themselves over
scholarly commentary. 237
This Article has proceeded under a grounded theory model. Discussions
have not focused on the nuances of how scholars want modem property theory
to be interpreted. These discussions admittedly ignore aspirations and ideals of
many of those authors. The point instead was to engage the modem tum toward
social relations as it is represented, accepted, and utilized within the law, and
particularly the case law, through recent years.
Grounded theory pushes us away from armchair speculation and toward
concrete experience. Climate change doesn't leave us with time for the
armchair speculation. What is important now is how the courts treat sociallyoriented concepts of property.
This Article has demonstrated that social relations approaches, as
represented in the case law, have failed environmental law by (1) supporting
such malleable concepts as social utility and (2) thinking in terms of the
individual as opposed to society, while ignoring the land itself. Without a
different approach to property, there is no good evidence to suggest that
sustainability can ever win. The cards are stacked against it.
Worse, the stakes are high when we cannot rely on federal and state
enforcement due to either politics or economics. Common law claims give the
American people a route to local enforcement of environmental norms when
federal and state enforcement fails. In other words, there are moments when
there is less enforcement because of national politics. Sometimes, there are key
reversals of protective policies that were not enshrined in statutes.
Alternatively, sometimes there is just a failure of enforcement. With too few
employees, an agency simply does not have the workforce power to accomplish
critical tasks like monitoring water quality throughout a large region.
Regulations give us a very limited and federal or state enforcer-one that is
highly reactive to politics. Additionally, we rely on agencies who may care but
don't have much of a stake and who are vulnerable to lobbyists.
With so many opportunities for legal concepts to be stretched, spun, and
shoved just enough, key property concepts in statutes and the common law need
explicit normative content. The failure of social relations concepts is in their
generality, which makes them highly malleable and responsive to political
pressures. Too much malleability means a legal concept is not truly normative.

237. Using a grounded theory approach in this context remains somewhat novel. As Noah
Weisbord said, "The qualitative methods of Glaser and Strauss, in spite of their internalization in other
areas of social research, have not yet penetrated the field of law." Noah Weisbord, Conceptualizing
Aggression, 20 DUKE J. COMPAR. & INT'L L. 1, 11 (2009).
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What is of greater utility than providing for human survival? Social utility
and other similar concepts must be understood in terms ofsustainability. Land
is our most fundamental home and worthy of a unique status from other types
of property. Land is the foundation of our survival and the possibility of
survival in the future. There isn't a plan B. Resources may be used, of course,
but thoughtfully, with particular emphasis on the climate-related externalities.
Survival and sustainability should unite the landowner and the public. The
original model of traditional property theory was a model of dominion and
control, often justified by highly sexist and exclusionary religious rhetoric. It
set up a world that was owner against others, emphasizing individual rights as
against the rest of society.
Modem property theory refocused on the community and a social relations
model of property. Notably, this is a conflict-based model-it assumes the best
for others is never (or rarely) best for the owner. It is a model that assumes the
tragedy of the commons. Moreover, such a model depends on a particular view
of human nature: one that is, ironically, highly individualistic and pessimistic.
People want to care about only themselves and we force them to care about
others, or at least correct them when they don't. In a way, it is almost selfdefeating: community-based solutions are employed precisely because people
are, allegedly, individualist and resistant to community, if not incapable of it.
This model places society in the position of the interferer with those original
ownership and dominion rights. Additionally, given that modem property
theory really didn't push back significantly against the prized right to exclude,
there is constant pushback on those grounds. Regulation is seen as a violation
of that right to exclude: regulation is seen as a reaching into property rights. 238
The conflict model is unhelpful, leaving us constantly figuring out how to
best allocate rights and maneuver fairly through the conflict. We need a new
model that will function for us in a climate crisis.
The challenge isn't so insurmountable as it may seem: All of our interests
have become united, to some degree. Wherever you live, climate change is a
problem within your own lifetime. No location avoids all the storms, droughts,
sea level rise, and unprecedented temperatures. No location avoids the
increased likelihood of new pandemic viruses. Even oil and gas executives

238. Joseph Singer made a similar argument: "The ownership model of property utterly fails to
incorporate an understanding of property rights as inherently limited both by the property rights of
others and by public policies designed to ensure that property rights are exercised in a manner
compatible with the public good." Singer, supra note 36, at 7. Singer concluded, "It makes regulations
of property appear inherently suspect. It presumes that when property rights are limited by government
regulation, an evil has been effectuated that bears a heavy burden of justification." Id.
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have to care when the whole world instantly goes on lockdown for months at a
time and oil prices actually go negative.239
The challenge of our lifetimes is to become the communal creature that I
optimistically believe we are. The new model must prioritize the land before
either the individual or the rest of society. Society and the individual are
important because they are acting on land, separately and together. Focusing
on ourselves, not the land, was central to creating the climate change era. We
worried about pollution mostly when it impacted our own health and only
occasionally when it impacted ecosystems. We minimized health problems that
weren't directly human problems. Fixing the problem requires reversing that
thought process. The focus has to be first on the land's wellbeing. Our
wellbeing will be the critical but indirect outcome.
If we must reword this theory in terms of social relations and community,
survival is social; sustainable is social. If we must reword in terms of social
utility, choices create a variety of social goods from happiness to tax dollars,
but in the era of climate change, sustainability should weigh heavier in the
analysis and set firm limits for externalities.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a final matter, watching the evolution of tort and property doctrine where
social utility is concerned should remind us that fuzziness and amenability to
change in any legal concept is a part of our ongoing jurisprudence. Slippage is
the norm, not the variation. Our baseline is change over time. The only
effective way to steer that change is to imbue key legal concepts with explicit
norms.
Property should not be theorized in terms of amorphous progressive social
relations but instead in terms of stewardship and survival. That survival
relationship was more obviously true in agrarian centuries past. Economic and
social changes have made the relationship less intuitive over time. Climate
change is making the link more intuitive again.
If we do not think in terms of stewardship and survival, then we are stuck
with the status quo, where every single regulation is a fight against that norm
of complete individual control. Every lawsuit is the owner against the world.
Our jurisprudence entangled the malleable idea of social utility with a norm of
industrial productivity. The tangle was less intentional, more accidental and
political. Sometimes the tangle came from nothing more than fuzzy analysis
and misplaced reliance on precedents. We must face these tangles and reclaim
239. Justin Worland, Oil Prices Won 't Be Negative Forever. But the Oil Industry Will Never
Be the Same, TIME (Apr. 20, 2020, 10:50 PM), https://time.com/5824263/coronavirus-negative-oilprices-consolidation/ [https://perma.cc/QYX9-K873].
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the idea of social utility by recognizing that sustainability is not only a core
human value but a requirement for survival.
I want to raise this concern about property theory now because I believe we
are about to expend a very, very precious resource that will take another fifty
years to re-build. That resource is an increasingly mobilized society that is
deeply concerned about human survival on this planet. I don't want to waste
that social energy on legal changes that erode quickly.

